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Abstract:  This paper revisits one of the more frequented stops at the crossroads 
of politics and morality in contemporary ethical theory, Michael Walzer’s essay “Political 
Action:  The Problem of Dirty Hands.”  The aim is to provide a fresh assessment of 
Walzer’s project, and to evaluate the tenability of its core notion of “dirty hands.”  In 
pursuit of this aim, the effort is made to reopen the paths which take Walzer to his 
celebrated impasse, from two directions.  The first of these resituates Walzer’s analysis in 
the context of the debate within Anglo-American ethical theory in which it is originally 
expounded.  The second route seeks to recapture the trail of thinkers who guide Walzer to 
his conclusions from more remote locations in intellectual history, in order to determine 
the reliability of his intriguing constellation of Machiavelli, Weber and Camus as 
lodestars. Writing thirty years later, one of Walzer’s friendliest interpreters, Jean 
Elshtain, in the midst of her enthusiasm for ‘dirty hands,’ renews doubts about his 
recommendation of “casuistry.” Hints from throughout Walzer’s essay, incompletely 
elaborated there, are parceled together into closing suggestions as to an alternative 
approach to so-called ‘dirty hands’ situations.   
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“Dirty hands,” as employed by Michael Walzer, is less a concept than the 
placeholder for an irremovable conceptual gap.  It marks an impasse where the ground of 
morals might seamlessly abut the realm of politics, but instead an unfathomable breach 
plunges below.  ‘Dirty hands’ labels a makeshift signpost in front of a notoriously 
treacherous region of theoretical fragility.   Walzer raises this placard as a warning to the 
unsuspecting who may yet stumble onto the perimeter of the domain it sets off.  From a 
backward glance, its dire cautions also extend consolation, of a sort, to the shaken souls 
who have somehow managed to stagger out the other side:  there was no easier way. 
Early on in “Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands,” Michael Walzer 
stipulates that the disturbing question he broaches is “not merely a philosopher’s 
question.”1  And on this, at the very least, he is no doubt correct.  For starters, by dint of 
the sources upon which he draws, Walzer implies that social theorists and playwrights 
may have critical purchase on the matter.  The enduring currency of “dirty hands” within 
the lexicon of philosophical catch-phrases in recent decades, however, surely owes more 
to this 1973 essay of Walzer than to the 1948 play of Jean Paul Sartre from which its 
subtitle is taken.2   
Interrupting a high-toned Oxbridge dialogue on ethical theory in the pages of 
Philosophy & Public Affairs, Michael Walzer attacks the subject in a distinctly more 
                                                 
1 Michael Walzer, “Political Action:  The Problem of Dirty Hands,” in Philosophy & Public Affairs  2, no. 2 (Winter, 1973), 161.   
2 I. Abel’s English translation of Sartre’s 1948 Les Mains sales is available in Vintage International’s No Exit and Three Other Plays.  
(NY: Vintage, 1989), 125 – 241.   
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down-to-earth, almost conversational idiom.  Walzer’s contribution takes up essentially 
the same topics the preceding discussants had tossed back and forth, while bringing to the 
foreground an issue the others had held as peripheral.  If the prose in this compact and 
elliptical essay of Walzer unfolds with comparative ease, however, its thoughts advance 
toward a point of ever more unrelieved unease.  And its substantive assertions are 
bordered by flashes of wit dark enough to augment the unsettling nature of Walzer’s 
reflections, though it never descends to cynicism.  The staying power of the central 
construct of “dirtyhands” is likely owed, at least in part, to the rhetorical bravado of 
Walzer’s original statement, including the novelistic detail of its test-case scenarios, the 
surprising diversity of its source material, and, perhaps most importantly, thanks to the 
provocation of the argument’s unabashedly searching and unfinished quality.  
Walzer’s  most direct definition of ‘dirty hands’ frames it as “a particular act of 
government [which] may be exactly the right thing to do in utilitarian terms and yet leave 
a man who does it guilty of a moral wrong.”3  Even apart from the glaring paradox which 
makes “doing the right thing” overlap with committing “moral wrong,” this formulation 
begs the question regarding our ability to determine “exactly the right thing to do”-- by 
means of utilitarianism or any other sure-fire methodology.   Insofar as he finds the 
dominant contemporary discourses of both deontology and utilitarianism wanting, Walzer 
does eventually venture farther afield -- quite a bit farther, it turns out, when he takes us 
to the origins of modern political philosophy.    Pursuing his quest for a more tenable 
interpretation of ‘dirty hands’ in greater earnest in the distinctive fifth and final section of  
                                                 
3 Walzer, “Political Action,” 161, emphasis added. 
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“Political Action,” leaving deontology and utilitarianism far underfoot, Walzer sets off on 
a whirlwind tour through five centuries of political theory, wherein he rediscovers his 
problematic in three distinct incarnations.   
To re-evaluate what Walzer is able to do in “Political Action,” it first seems 
appropriate to re-trace Walzer’s own steps – and this is not always easy, given his agility 
in deftly hopping from one paradigm to another before hinting at his own conclusions.  
But Walzer’s project also seems to invite at least a few stabs at evaluation on the plane of 
practical endeavor to which his ruminations here, as elsewhere in his work, closely hew.  
As in Walzer’s book-length studies, the argument of this small essay is developed 
through formulations redolent of historical truth and rich in practical exemplification 
rather than merely through abstract deductions.  The looming proximity of the realm of 
political action itself to Walzer’s argument, not to mention the imposing historical sweep 
of its few brief pages , magnify the complexity of the challenge, but also raise the stakes 
for untangling its logic.  Looking forward and behind, it seems impossible to avoid the 
question:  How differently might the ideas of Walzer’s “Political Action” encourage 
political actors to act?  The author cannot intend his reflections to be irrelevant to this 
derived inquiry, speculation about which seems germane to a reasonable critique. 
Thus, perhaps fair light is reflected on the viability of Walzer’s position by taking 
stock of some of the wide influence it has enjoyed.  In particular, one of Walzer’s most 
fervent admirers, Jean Elshtain, has claimed to find inspiration in his ‘dirty hands’ 
framework for some notable interventions in leading public controversies of the twenty-
first century, as well as for the theoretical projects that have supported her activism in the 
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same period.   Taking Walzer’s ruminations even further from the chalkboard than had 
he, Elshtain uses them as a platform for a series of highly combustible polemics.  That 
Walzer himself sometimes weighed in on the same controversies, with equal passion, 
does not in itself do much to settle the question of the legitimacy of Elshtain’s claim 
regarding the derivation of her thinking from that of Walzer in “Political Action.”  To the 
extent that Elshtain is credible as an interpreter of Walzer’s ‘dirty hands’ theory, what do 
her advertised attempts to apply that theory do, if anything, to make that theory either 
more or less appealing?    
Walzer’s theory of ‘dirty hands’ contemplated a context of war at its inception.  
Thus, when the arrival of an actual situation of international conflict grabbed not only 
headlines but the attention of well-informed authorities on the ethics of warfare, this 
awful turn of events might at least seem an opportune moment to observe the most self-
conscious of ‘dirty hands’ take hold of reality.  Despite Walzer’s distinctive appreciation 
for the ineradicable place of guilt in noble leadership, in the event that the judgments a 
‘dirty hands’ perspective have been taken to underwrite for someone like Jean Elshtain 
are found suspect, it is hoped that a test of Walzer’s theory in “Political Action” against 
the vaunted applications of one of its leading sympathizers can amount to more than an 
exercise in guilt by association.  It is with the partial aim of laying a firmer basis for this 
ultimate comparison that some deeper excavation of the main lines of influence on 
Walzer’s theory, and a reconstituting of it from a fuller understanding of its original 
component parts, is pursued in the following pages. And if even this patient effort at 
reconstruction is not found capable of making Walzer’s theory fully persuasive, 
 5 
Elsthtain’s apparent stumbles as a political thinker and social critic amid an actual fog of 
war may draw a darker cloud over Walzer’s deliberately grey area than his theory can 
live with.   
  
 6 
I  The Dilemma Posed:  Nagel & Hare   
Writing at the height of U.S. involvement in the war in Indochina, Thomas Nagel 
searches for a theoretical basis upon which tactics such as aerial bombardment of 
villages, indiscriminate antipersonnel weapons, massive dislocation of populations, 
torture of prisoners, use of napalm, slaughter of hostages, biological weapons, and 
inducement of mass starvation can be placed totally out of the legitimate reach of nations 
at war.  This search is spawned in part by doubts that a typically utilitarian focus on 
outcomes can adequately limit war-time measures.  “Once the door is opened to 
calculations of utility and national interest,” Nagel fears, “the usual speculations about 
the future of freedom, peace, and economic prosperity can be brought to bear to ease the 
consciences of those responsible for a certain number of charred babies.”4   In “War and 
Massacre,” Nagel takes for his topic, “the most general moral problem raised by the 
conduct of warfare:  the problem of means and ends.”  Careful reflection on this problem 
invariably runs aground, he finds, at a point of “conflict between two disparate categories 
of moral reason.”  As Nagel defines them:  “Utilitarianism gives primacy to a concern 
with what will happen.  Absolutism gives primacy to a concern with what one is doing.”5    
Because for an absolutist, according to Thomas Nagel, “it is not allowable to do 
certain things” -- such as, for instance,  deliberately executing hostages and 
indiscriminately killing non-combatants, “we cannot deliberate on whether such measures 
are justified by the fact that they will avert still greater evils, for as intentional measures 
                                                 
4 Thomas Nagel, “War and Massacre,”  Philosophy & Public Affairs  1, no. 2 (Winter, 1972), 129. 
5 Ibid., 124.   
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they cannot be justified in terms of any consequences whatever,” and this will remain 
true even under circumstances of warfare.6   But this may serve to accentuate the tension:  
The fact remains that when an absolutist knows or believes that the utilitarian cost of refusing to 
adopt a prohibited course will be very high, he may hold to his refusal to adopt it, but he will find it 
difficult to feel that a moral dilemma has been satisfactorily resolved. The same may be true of 
someone who rejects an absolutist requirement and adopts instead the course yielding the most 
acceptable consequences. In either case, it is possible to feel that one has acted for reasons 
insufficient to justify violation of the opposing principle.7 
 
Ultimately, Nagel is led to “a somewhat qualified defense of absolutism.”8  
Prohibitions on evils such as the deliberate killing of noncombatants -- no matter the 
consequences -- will be restored; however, they will operate “as a limitation on utilitarian 
reasoning, not a substitute for it.”   Nagel’s “qualified absolutist,” in other words, “can be 
expected to try to maximize good and minimize evil, so long as this does not require him 
to transgress an absolute prohibition like that against murder.”9   
After searching earnestly for clarity he cannot find in utilitarianism, Nagel thus 
stops short of fleeing all the way into the arms of deontology, which would posit absolute 
rights.  In fact, he leaves off on a note of haunting ambiguity, gesturing toward the 
possibility of eventually hitting “a moral blind alley.”  He fixes the coordinates of this 
impasse so:  “a previously innocent person”  is faced with “a choice between morally 
abominable courses of action.”10   A general example might be “a case in which someone 
is bound to die, but who it is will depend on what one does,” and “nothing one could do 
                                                 
6 Nagel, “War and Massacre,” 128.   
7 Ibid., 143.   
8 Ibid., 126 
9 Ibid., 128 
10 Ibid., 143.   
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would be morally permissible.”11    For Nagel, “to say that someone can do X and not do 
X, and that for him to take either course would be wrong … is not in itself a 
contradiction.”  Indeed, “it is naïve to suppose that there is a solution to every moral 
problem with which the world can face us.”12  
Two replies to Nagel appear in the same 1972 issue of Philosophy & Public 
Affairs.  These initial responses both work from the premise that Nagel’s concerns can be 
resolved by enlarging utilitarianism instead of searching for an external corrective to it.13  
Rom Hare insists that the incoherent relationship in which Nagel leaves utilitarianism and 
absolutism cannot be allowed to stand -- nor need it, under the right view of maximizing 
benefits, or a position he names “specific rule utilitarianism.”14  By applying specific rule 
utilitarianism, we can develop “good general principles” for use in moral education, thus 
in turn enabling us to evaluate the results of their acceptance in future states of affairs.  
For example, adequate inhibitions regarding conduct that ought to be foresworn in war-
time can be inculcated through proper military training, and some time later we can make 
sure this policy has fixed the problem. 
Hare allows that his answer of making use of specific rule utilitarianism may not 
fully succeed in eclipsing situations when it may be difficult to know whether one needs 
to come up with a new general principle or simply apply one previously established -- or, 
in other words, tell us what to do when “sticking to one of the general principles” rather 
                                                 
11 Ibid., 129 – 130.  
12 Ibid., 144.   
13 The first reply, passed over here in preference of a concentration on Hare, was R.B. Brandt’s “Utilitarianism and the Rules of 
War,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 1, no. 2 (Winter 1972): 145 – 165.   
14 Rom Hare, “Rules of War and Moral Reasoning,”  Philosophy & Public Affairs 1, no.2 (Winter 1972): 166 -181.  
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than “engaging in more specific reasoning” seems “unlikely to be for the best.  In any 
case, Hare deems the occasions when the problem might turn out to be “too rigid 
adherence” to good general principles “very rare.”15    
In short, Hare contends that rather than remaining frozen on the battlefield, Nagel 
could have solved his problem by retreating to higher ground.  Nagel’s supposed “blind 
alleys” are, from Hare’s point-of-view,  pseudo-problems averted by an enhanced 
understanding of utilitarianism, making needless any new limitations, additions or 
replacements to its calculi.  Even conjuring “blind alleys”’ hypothetically bespeaks a 
superficial point of view, according to Hare. And, the wrong sort of theorizing bears 
immediate practical hazards in Hare’s estimation.  He worries that such mental exercises 
may in themselves be dangerous “because many people will think that, if there is no way 
of escaping guilt, only the neurotic will worry about it.”16  Since he need not fall prey to 
the kind of “pharisaism” which holds our moral principles “epistemologically 
sacrosanct,” and does not confuse “moral integrity and peace of mind,” the utilitarian can 
keep his general principles holstered as “indispensable practical guides.”  Hare’s parting 





                                                 
15 Ibid.   
16 Ibid., 179.   
17 Ibid., 179-180. 
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II  The Dilemma Deflected:  Walzer with Machiavelli 
The fourth and final entry in the colloquium in which Nagel and Hare 
participated, “Political Action:  The Problem of Dirty Hands” by Michael Walzer, did not 
appear until the following year, and took a different tack, spreading out a larger canvass 
as backdrop for the problem.  Though Hare can only shake his head when Nagel backs 
himself into a blind alley, by the point of  “Political Action:  The Problem of ‘Dirty 
Hands’,” Michael Walzer chooses to linger in this trap and explore its full dimensions for 
the duration of his own piece.18  Such places of impasse name for Walzer a starting point 
rather than a dead-end.   Defying Hare’s insistence that a safe alternative route by-passing 
the shadowy realm of moral blind alleys could easily be mapped out, Walzer begins by 
suggesting these constitute a larger region than any of the preceding papers have 
acknowledged, and proceeds from the conviction that this twilight realm where 
justification stalls out and normal principles cannot light the way ahead is worthy of more 
than an afterthought.  Walzer takes ownership of the problem Nagel had introduced as 
“blind alleys,” amplifying its political echoes by borrowing the title of a Sartre play to 
rename it: “dirty hands.”19 Walzer suggests that the   problem Nagel spied on fields of 
military battle is endemic to politics itself.  
Any within earshot of loose talk of “moral blind alleys,” Hare reckons, would be 
liable to leap to the conclusion that “if there is no way of escaping guilt, only the neurotic 
                                                 
18 Michael Walzer, “Political Action:  The Problem of ‘Dirty Hands,’” in Philosophy & Public Affairs  2, no. 2 (Winter, 1973), 160 – 
180.   
19 I. Abel’s English translation of Sartre’s 1948 Les Mains sales is available in Vintage International’s No Exit and Three Other 
Plays.  (NY: Vintage, 1989), 125 – 241.   
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will worry about it.”20   Surely, Hare reasons, such blithe dismissals will cause moral 
deliberation prior to action itself to be too lightly regarded.  Walzer proceeds from the 
conviction that in political life there are indeed particular and inevitable situations in 
which there will be found to be “no way of escaping guilt.”  But, contra Hare, he also 
sees there as being eminently good reasons for the political person to worry about it.    
‘Dirty hands’ designates the loci for “a way of maneuvering between two very 
different and characteristically opposed understandings of morality.”21   The initial 
significance of ‘dirty hands’ within the context of the Philosophy & Public Affairs 
colloquium is that Walzer is able to posit a juncture where the dueling theories of 
deontology and utilitarianism might collide, and where one would have to give ground to 
the other.  Key to establishing the concept of a special subset of political decisions that fit 
the definition of what Walzer calls ‘dirty hands,’ hence, is the hypothesis of a moment 
where exigent circumstances of a certain magnitude and nature force a leader to shift 
gears from deontology to utilitarianism (or vice versa).  But whichever perspective is 
found subordinate to the other at this juncture is presumed willing to step aside for the 
moment – and, in so doing, not required to surrender claims as to its overall validity.    
 In short, the very idea embodied in Walzer’s notion of ‘dirty hands’ needs to 
somehow sustain the validity of both the philosophy of consequentialist utilitarianism and 
that of rights-based deontology – each in its proper quarter.  “Both of these moral 
                                                 
20 Ibid., 179.   
21 Michael Walzer, “Emergency Ethics,” in Arguing About War (New Haven:  Yale University Press, 2004), 35.   
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understandings have claims upon us, and yet they pull us in different directions.”22  
Useful as it is in advancing his argument, Walzer’s imagination of a political mentality in 
which both utilitarianism and deontology can cohabit in some larger, pluralistic sense, 
patiently waiting for the other to complete its work across an amicable division of 
responsibility, is highly problematic.  The implied attempt to glibly split the difference 
between deontology and utilitarianism  by curtailing the totalizing aspirations of the 
paradigm in question can occur only with the help of a conceptually cloudy description of 
the nature of decision-making in a certain type of crisis situation.   
By starting from an assumption that either utilitarianism or deontology can kick in 
at just the point where the other ceases to be relevant -- without negating the other’s 
insights or swallowing them whole --Walzer needs to implicitly construct a moral default 
position in which each of these respective theory stands at the ready, waiting for the 
moment when the politician decides to fetch the accoutrement from whichever end of his 
intellectual mantelpiece seems to offer the best ammunition for addressing the crisis 
presently unfolding in his realm.  But a politician who finds himself deciding to override 
a deontological obligation in order to achieve what he deems a more pressing 
consequentialist end will have trouble explaining why the obligation overridden was ever 
a valid concern – or might be again in other circumstances.  Nevertheless, in “Political 
Action,’ Walzer accepts no obligation to demarcate the threshold for shifting to a 
preference for outcomes over duties, and never promises a true reconciliation between the 
rival assumptions of deontology and utilitarianism.  Instead, his account posits some 
                                                 
22 Ibid., 35.   
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pivot-point for moving from one model to the other the nature of which it does little to 
illuminate.    
But purists of neither outlook would ever so freely deign to partake of the 
assumptions of its rival, given that each insists on a status of mutual incompatibility –
while, at the same time, asserting its power to colonize all outliers..    These perennial 
antagonists would agree that either one has a claim on us which invalidates the claims of 
its opposite, or it has no pull on us at all.  What neither ‘deontology’ nor ‘utilitarianism’ 
strictly speaking can abide is the contemplation of some arrangement (of the sort implied 
by both Walzer and Nagel) in which someone could be a deontologist in some 
circumstances and a utilitarian in others, as if trading hats – or a utilitarian to a certain 
point, and a deontologist thereafter.   
On one level, ‘dirty hands,’ as presented by Walzer,  is a proposal to resolve a 
consequentialist/absolutist stalemate, by at first by seeming to split the difference.  But 
neither of the combatants between whom he attempts to mediate would accept either the 
terms of his mediation, or even the need for it.  For the same set of reasons, even to locate 
‘dirty hands’ at a posited point of intersection between utilitarianism and deontology 
conjures a problem the very prospect of which thoroughgoing adherents of neither 
utilitarianism nor deontology can acknowledge. It is in this sense that Walzer’s notion of 
‘dirty hands’ does not cover a situation of true dilemma: it does not present a choice 
between contradictory obligations to the same principle, or even to two principles equally 
weighted in every philosophically relevant sense.  Rather, it somehow posits the need for 
a practical choice between contradictory principles.   
 14 
For their part, loyalists on either side aspire to a synoptic vantage, rejecting the 
notion that there could be such a thing as genuine moral tragedy, and are thus prone to 
seeking to explain away the so-called problem of something like a “moral blind alley” on 
some ostensibly higher plane of analysis than any within which it could even appear.    
Rom Hare’s reaction to Thomas Nagel’s ‘blind alleys’ is representative in this sense of 
the reactions typical of most orthodox proponents of both utilitarianism and deontology 
to the rival they perceive in one another.    With his reformulated principle of “specific 
rule utilitarianism,” Hare claims he can subsume all possible rival positions without 
addition or remainder. 23  Even without seeing a necessity to reach quite as far as the 
sophistication of Hare’s ‘specific rule utilitarianism,’ many utilitarians maintain they 
have found a way to preempt deontological objections by according rights violations 
adequate weight in moral calculation, as net additions to suffering.  When it comes their 
turn, many deontologists also submerge the polarity, proposing to bring classic utilitarian 
considerations back in under a properly deontological rubric like ‘the right to life.’   
To facilitate  partisan theoretical victory, deontology and utilitarianism both have 
their respective stockpiles of casuistry at the ready.   Granted, to any outsider, the 
sharpest differences may ultimately resemble little more than a contest of highly technical 
vernaculars – where it may even seem to evaporate.  To wit: Rom Hare’s formula for 
“specific rule utilitarianism” sets it up as the all-purpose “microscope,” through the 
impeccable lens of which “we judge the morality of a particular act by assessing the 
utility of universal observance of the highly specific principle which requires acts of just 
                                                 
23 Hare, “Rules,” 177.    
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this sort in just this sort of circumstances.”24   In the stratosphere of such abstractions,  
utilitarianism can be seen, at the apex of its sophistication, landing within parodic 
proximity to the formalisms of higher Kantianism; the extremes meet.  As Bernard 
Williams notes from the obverse angle:  “Kantianism can be made instantly into a kind of 
consequentialism – a kind which identifies the states of affairs that have intrinsic value 
…. as those which consist of actions being performed for duty’s sake.”25   
Even if, incredibly, in the outcome Walzer needs, one pole on the compass of 
contemporary ethical study suddenly concedes that, by itself, it is not able to offer 
adequate guidance in all situations, and settles for a somehow brokered arrangement of 
timely alternation with its counterpart – there is still a void at the interstices: How does 
one determine that such a point has arrived, since to survey it within the scope of either 
deontology or utilitarianism itself would beg the question?   
Walzer seems to realize that the only way to finesse the immediate and 
formidable difficulties presented by his desire to have it both ways as regards deontology 
and utilitarianism in a way neither camp would find acceptable is to change the subject.  
But this he adroitly proceeds to do.  No sooner is his initial proposal advanced than 
Walzer seems to soar beyond the field of conflict where it had emerged, surpassing both 
of the frameworks that had clashed there.   
As soon as he has given his best efforts to convincing those drawn to either 
utilitarianism or absolutism that ‘dirty hands’ is a real problem, without declaring victory, 
                                                 
24 Hare, “Rules,” 177.    
25 Williams, “A Critique of Utilitarianism,” 85.  As far as Kant himself as a casuist, there has been lively debate for decades: W.I. 
Matson, “Kant as Casuist,” The Journal of Philosophy, 51, no. 25 (1954):  855 – 860.  H.D. Kittsteiner, “Kant and Casuistry,” in 
Conscience and Casuistry in Early Modern Europe, ed. Edmund Leites (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1988), 188 – 213.   
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Walzer simply departs the scene of the initial skirmish.   He then begin to casts about for 
a suppler moral framework to accommodate the phenomenon in a way neither deontology 
nor utilitarianism can manage.   He wonders whether any backdrop unafraid to leave the 
inherent incongruity of ‘dirty hands’ exposed might be preferable.  Leaving aside for the 
time being, then, Walzer’s problematic construction of compatibility between deontology 
and utilitarianism, we attempt to follow his gaze toward the stars of his enlarged 
firmament.  
Thus does Walzer’s project transition into an effort to chart some possible vantage 
points from which the politician who has already resigned herself to ‘dirty hands’ can 
reflect back on her actions in terms of a morality which is suited to politics, as precisely 
opposed to being merely what Hare had termed “neurotic”  -- if by ‘neurotic’ here we 
allude to some generalized, disabling anxiety with an endogenous root (something 
perhaps akin to what confessors once might have identified as the sin of ‘scrupulosity’).  
This is to say, Walzer’s explicit aim is not to furnish the terms for public justification of 
action which brings on ‘dirty hands’ – adhering to the notion that such is in principle 
unavailable -- so much as to explore ways for the dirty-handed politician to understand 
herself.  To this extent, Walzer’s theoretical aims could be characterized as therapeutic in 
nature.   
The teachings of Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber and Albert Camus are briskly 
mined in turn for building blocks of Walzer’s own theory of ‘dirty hands.’  The 
implication is given that each of these alternative perspectives has an element to add, 
though none by itself, or even in combination, can be made to comprise an impervious 
 17 
edifice.  But Walzer makes no strong exegetical to justify his use of the individual names 
he brandishes or the labels he attaches to his paraphrases of the associated positions. 
Rather, these titles and figures appeal to him as convenient short-hand for general lines of 
reasoning which help him elaborate his own thinking.   Despite this limit to his ambition, 
Walzer manages to telescope impressively wide vistas of thought within a remarkably 
acute set of angles.   
The precursors from whom Walzer seeks his inheritance are a quite disparate lot, 
and the fact that these antecedents cannot be aligned according to any single 
methodology complicates Walzer’s project of blending them together into an alternative 
to such clear-cut doctrines as those from which he initially sets out.   But Walzer has little 
choice but to develop his argument in a piecemeal rather than a systematic fashion.  He 
assembles an admittedly provisional bric-a-brac model  from the shards left behind by the 
troika Machiavelli, Weber and Camus.   But by claiming such a distinguished pedigree 
for the argument he slyly advances in the second half of his article, we are left to feel that 
each of strands of thinking upon which Walzer proceeds to draw is worthy of further 
unspooling.     
Walzer begins his quest for more illuminating beacons in seeing our way through 
‘dirty hands’ dilemmas with reference to what he calls “the literature of political action.” 
In the first instance, he apparently means by this works of theatre.26   It soon becomes 
clear that he is also turning back to the classical literature of political theory.  Walzer 
                                                 
28
 Ibid., 174.  This “literature” for Walzer obviously includes the plays of Sartre and Camus .  In “Marxism and Dirty Hands,” Steven 
Lukes also makes good use of Bertold Brecht.  Steven Lukes, Moral Conflict and Politics (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1991), 189 – 
193.    
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takes Niccolo Machiavelli as his first model, and indeed the Florentine continues to hover 
like an unholy patron saint over the remainder of Walzer’s enterprise. By marking the 
transition from a first section which glosses the preceding discussion by contemporaries 
Nagel, Brandt, and Hare, the unannounced arrival of Machiavelli in the second section of 
“Political Action” invites the classification of Walzer’s notion of ‘dirty hands’ itself as a 
‘Machiavellian problem’ – if it does not count as the Machiavellian problem.    Walzer 
reaches even further toward a Machiavellian sweep in his own re-statement on ‘dirty 
hands” fifteen years later, by positing circumstances of “supreme emergency” during 
which “morality itself is devalued.”27 
“How men live is so different from how they should live that a ruler who does not 
do what is generally done, but persists in doing what ought to be done, will undermine his 
power rather than maintain it,” writes Machiavelli in Chapter 16 of The Prince.  
“Therefore, a ruler who wishes to maintain his power must be prepared to act immorally 
when this becomes necessary.”28  The redoubtable staying-power of The Prince is to an 
inestimable degree owed to the exceptional openness of the text to a variety of 
interpretations.  Though this may have enabled many to find in its pages the advice they 
most needed at the time they most needed it in pursuit of virtuous tasks of self-
government, it has also been taken to reinforce the vicious complacency of tyrants.  The 
studied ambiguity of its brilliant epigrams has enabled those words to decorate banners 
                                                 
27 Walzer, “Emergency Ethics,” 40.  
28 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Russell Price (NY:  Cambridge University Press, 1998), 54 – 55.  In Chapter 41 of the 
Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livy, Book III, we also find Machiavelli saying: “For when the safety of one’s country 
wholly depends on the decision to be taken, no attention should be paid either to justice or injustice, to kindness or cruelty, or to its 
being praiseworthy or ignominious.  On the contrary, every other consideration being set aside, that alternative should be 
wholeheartedly adopted which will save the life and preserve the freedom of one’s country?”  Niccolo Machiavelli, The Discourses, 
trans. Leslie Walker, S.J., (London:  Penguin, 1970), 514.     
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hoisted above all manner of villainy.29  Knowledge of this legacy of Machiavellian 
interpretations intensifies our own responsibilities as readers of Machiavelli, rather than 
lightening them.  But fulfilling those responsibilities would take us well beyond our own 
ambitions here.  As unfair as it might in some sense be to leave off with paraphrase in 
this instance, Walzer has a point in suggesting that, to the extent that the portrait is filled-
in, to something like the same extent it thereby becomes less Machiavellian.   
The significance of the Machiavellian teaching in the second section of “Political 
Action” is that Machiavelli never says what makes the “good man” who needs lessons in 
“how not to be good” good.  As readers of Machiavelli, Walzer suggests we are left free 
to more or less fill in the blank.  It does not matter how one comes to decide that 
something like murder or deceit is wrong.  Any good politician will have already done so.  
The point is: whatever the source of their moral qualms, political actors need to realize 
that at times these qualms must be set aside.   
In the fifth section of “Political Action” to which we will hereafter pay most 
careful attention,  Machiavelli makes an encore as the spokesperson for what Walzer at 
this point calls the neoclassical position.  “Neoclassisism” here denotes an emphasis on 
the necessity of prudentially favoring consequentialism over morality in all cases of 
political judgment.  As consistent with the earlier gloss on Machiavelli, the neo-classical 
position is committed to the paradox of presupposing moral limits even though it 
endorses no particular set.  Even though such standards are presumed to have force for 
                                                 
29 To review only part of the record of only the twentieth century we might begin with: E.A. Rees, Political Thought from 
Machiavelli to Stalin:  Revolutionary Machiavellianism.  (NY:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).  And Joseph Femia, “Machiavelli and 
Italian Fascism,” History of Political Thought 25, no. 1 (2004): 1 – 15.   
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the good man to whom Machiavelli’s discourse is directed, the main purpose of that 
discourse is to enjoin that main to prepare to set aside whatever moral norms he has 
internalized or the sake of the power and glory which attend successful defense of a 
republic.   This paradox defines the neoclassical position on ‘dirty hands’ according to 
Walzer. And though this position also might be seen to comprise the backdrop for 
Walzer’s analysis overall, it fails to satisfy him.  Thus, he proceeds to consider two 
additional ways of taking up the problem.   
Next Walzer turns to what he calls the “Protestant” view, which he derives from 
Max Weber’s lecture on politics.  This turns out to be a posture not of traditional faith so 
much a tragic heroism.  And finally, Walzer’s story comes to rest with what he calls the 
“Catholic” view, finding it best embodied by the violent radicals depicted in Camus’s The 
Just Assassins.30  Walzer does not suppress his own lingering dissatisfaction even by the 
conclusion of “Political Action.”   Conceding that each of the points-of-view he has 
traced probably captures an essential aspect of what is by its nature a multi-faceted 
phenomenon, Walzer frankly admits his own inability to “put together the compound 
view that might be wholly right.”31   Nevertheless, having turned over three partial 
answers plucked from the canon, Walzer does call that he which he has ascribed to 
Camus “the most attractive.”32   This view is recommended by its openness to what 
Walzer calls “casuistry.”    
                                                 
30 Stuart Gilbert’s English translation of Camus’ 1950 play Les Justes is published in Caligua & Three Other Plays (NY:  Vintage 
Books, 1958), 233 – 302. 
31 Walzer, “Political Action,”175.   
32 Ibid., 179.  
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In his most explicit revisit to the milieu of “Political Action,” fifteen years later, 
Walzer presents himself as leery of opening the door too wide to “utilitarian calculation,” 
and professes to favor “rights normality” over “the utilitarianism of extremity.”   The 
danger such an opening would represent to Walzer is that, by giving too much ground to 
“the utilitarianism of extremity,” we will gradually allow this preference to close out 
other options, and thus be led over time to “imitate our worst enemies.”33    
By the time of his 1988 restatement, “Emergency Ethics,” Walzer takes pains to 
emphasize that “the human world is a world of limitation, and moral limits are never 
suspended.”    
But there are moments when the rules can be and perhaps have to be overridden. They have to be 
overridden precisely because they have not been suspended.  And overriding the rules leaves guilt 
behind, as a recognition of the enormity of what we have done and a commitment not to make our 
actions into an easy precedent for the future.34 
 
The main question: If, in the end, moral limits can indeed never be suspended, 
how can moments when they are “overridden” be distinguished from those in which they 
are simply ignored?  “Morality is not negotiable.  Innocence is inviolable,” Walzer 
declares near the beginning of “Emergency Ethics.”35  But his argument is damaged by 
his contemplation of the possibility that, in certain situations, “morality itself” might be 
“devalued” – without saying more about what this would mean.  Even the strictest 
Machiavellian Walzer can countenance “depends upon the general stability of the 
standards” and needs “reasons for his reluctance” to override them.36   But the 
                                                 
33 Ibid., 37, 40, 47.   
34 Michael Walzer, “Emergency Ethics,” in Arguing About War (New Haven:  Yale University Press, 2006), 34. 
35 Ibid., 36.   
36 Ibid., 175; 166. 
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Machiavellian aspect of Walzer’s project in “Political Action”  exacerbates worries about 
its vagueness at such key points, insofar as it commits him to the proposition that it 
makes no difference where one’s system of moral and restraints is acquired.  For without 
an account which more clearly elaborates sources for the derivation of rights, speculation 
about a point where rights could legitimately be abrogated seems problematic at best.  
Walzer writes that “it is only by reflecting on the meaning of innocence and on the rights 
of the innocent that we can decide where in fact to stop.”37   But he never offers adequate 
clues as to where such reflection can begin.   
Moreover, Walzer’s decision to abruptly conclude his search for an answer to 
‘dirty hands’ so close to his cursory introduction the notion of “casuistry” intensifies 
rather than resolving the challenges of  his account.  Patly defining “casuistry” as the 
fixing of “a determinate penalty for a determinate crime” in no way does justice to the 
complex meanings the term has inherited over time.  Nor can the bare-bones formulation 
Walzer leaves us with satisfy our need to understand what Walzer needs the concept to 
do for his argument with adequate precision.  Why Walzer expects readers to settle for 
his gesture of doing little more than tossing out the term “casuistry” before trailing off in 
his analysis is beyond mysterious.  This abiding mystery leaves us with two alternatives 
to fill out Walzer’s account in a manner in keeping with its spirit.  One is to probe more 
deeply the source Walzer himself cites: Albert Camus.  The other is to turn back to other 
sources for understanding “casuistry” available in uses of the term beyond whatever 
                                                 
37 Ibid., 39.   
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sense Walzer can extract from a single reference to a literary he concedes might be found 
“a little bizarre.”38  
Obviously, it is by conscious design that the concept of “casuistry” is left, at best, 
in no more than skeletal form even by the end of “Political Action.”  Walzer is surely at 
peace with the deliberately heterodox nature of his proposal to rehabilitate given the 
resounding ill repute in which the very term has, by common knowledge, languished for 
centuries.   But Walzer’s plan to resurrect casuistry as the best available response to ‘dirty 
hands,’ if it is to be taken seriously at all, demands fleshing out by a more extended and 
historically informed discussion of the casuistic style of reasoning, both as an institution 
of religious moralizing and as a secularized ethical and legal practice, than, relying solely 
on the questionable assistance of Camus, Walzer himself begins to provide.39  
Preliminary to this investigation, it might be found that Walzer’s two initial 
“traditions of explanation” do not work so much at cross-purposes as he implies.  
 
  
                                                 
38 Walzer, “Political Action,” 178.   
39 Stephen Toulmin and Albert Jonsen’s The Abuse of Casuistry:  A History of Moral Reasoning.  (Berkeley, CA:  University of 
California Press, 1988) is by far the most impressive attempt to rehabilitate casuistry since Pascal.    
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III  The Dilemma Deepened:  Weber  
The “Vocation Lectures” find Max Weber operating in a distinctly, if  
uncharacteristically Machiavellian mode – that is to say, giving advice.  In “Politics as a 
Vocation,” in particular, Weber, speaking in Munich in 1919, recommends an orientation 
toward action to the youth of a nation riven by the deepest strife.  To the extent that his 
conception of the rationality of power is instrumental, Weber is certainly not anti-
Machiavellian.  Political action is to be evaluated according to Weber in terms of 
“success.”40  But the Walzer’s contrast between Weber’s position and the preceding 
sketch may be overdraws.  Machiavelli and Weber fundamentally agree in seeing 
morality as a set of pieties that much be promptly discarded by an effective leader at the 
right moment.  And the ideal image of a beautiful political action for Weber himself is 
drawn from the correspondence of the Machiavelli who advises Vettori: “If you decide 
on war … go to it like mad, for desperation often finds remedies which choice has been 
unable to discover.”41  Weber’s leader would seem, if anything, even more hard-hearted 
and prone to violence than Machiavelli’s Prince.  Granted, to a much greater degree than 
Machiavelli, however, Weber seems haunted by absolutes, as he peers into “a polar night 
of icy darkness and harshness.”42  Moreover, Weber has arrived at a recognition of the 
hollowness of mere efficiency.    
Despite his obsession with the necessity of a stout gaze into the abyss, the 
legitimacy of norms to guide decision remains a pressing concern for Weber -- ever the 
                                                 
40 Max Weber, The Vocation Lectures, trans. Rodney Livingston, 84. (Indianapolis, IN:  Hackett Publishing, 2004). 
41 Machiavelli’s April 17, 1527 letter is mistakenly attributed by Weber to the History of Florence.  Weber, Ibid., 91.  Machiavelli, 
The Prince and Other Works, trans. Allan Gilbert. (Chicago:  Packard and Company, 1941), 270.   
42 Ibid., 93.   
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more so now that the illusion of transcendental support for any given set of norms has 
evaporated; “longing and waiting … for new prophets and saviors … is not enough.”43  
Someone must act.  The Weberian leader must resolve to impose his will in a twilight 
realm in which metaphysical certainties persist under marks of erasure.   “At this point 
we find ourselves caught up in a conflict of ultimate worldviews, and it falls to us to 
choose between them.”44  To be a Machiavellian founder of a republic begins to seem a 
modest feat compared to the task of a modern leader as understood by Weber – for it is 
the latter’s charge to found a world-view.   
Like the utilitarian, Weber cannot abide “an absolutist ethic” which “refuses to 
inquire about ‘consequences.’”45  The politician is properly concerned with “the future 
and our responsibility for the future.”46  Excavating the roots of the utilitarian premise, 
however, Weber references the “elder Mill” (this would be James, the father of John 
Stuart) with the added disclaimer:  “whose philosophy I do not otherwise admire,” and 
observes that this grandfather of utilitarianism was already “right on this one point when 
he said that if you take pure experience as your starting point, you will end up in 
polytheism.”47  Thus does the German sage put in the mouth of the patriarch of English 
ethics an acknowledgement of the radical relativism Weber spies at end of the line for 
consistent adherence to the bland nostrums of utilitarianism.  This subversive interception 
and extrapolation from Mill’s inheritance is turned into an endorsement of Weber’s far 
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46 Ibid., 80. 
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greater pessimism about the morals of politics: there being left no alternative to the said 
“polytheism” – and, given Weber’s obvious agnosticism, we wonder if the cited 
theological category does not serve as a metaphorical euphemism for nihilism. 
“Conscience” or “commitment” for Weber refer to nothing more than a personal 
god or a demon, and each individual has to decide for himself “which one is the devil and 
which the god for him.”48   But for Weber, everyone who enters politics must share a 
point of view which has made peace “with power and violence as a means.”  To this 
extent, “whoever becomes involved in politics … has made a pact with satanic powers.”49   
If there is a “conscience” appropriate to politics as a vocation, that is, if any gods can be 
heard, none but a demon can be obeyed.  “The genius, or the demon, of politics lives in 
an inner tension with the God of love as well as with the Christian God as 
institutionalized in the Christian churches.”50  
Violence is absolutely unavoidable in politics, Weber insists repeatedly --- at least 
as a latent threat upholding order.  But the most violent political agent, he suggests, will 
be “the man who fights for his faith, whether religious or revolutionary.”51   Those 
transfixed by “a pseudoethical feeling of self-righteousness” who hypocritically 
“repudiate every action that makes use of morally suspect means,” but propose to usher 
in a reign of perfect justice on earth, “a situation in which all violence will have been 
destroyed,”  eventually turn into “chiliastic prophets ” capable of inspiring even more 
extreme violence through the “apparatus” of their followers with the inevitable encounter 
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of worldly resistance to their other-worldly convictions.52  Weber proceeds to enumerate 
one Judeo-Christian maxim after another, only to unblushingly explain why it would 
need to be laid aside in the context of political action.  The Bolshevists and Spartacists 
are credited by Weber with more valid insight into the ethic of politics than the Sermon 
on the Mount, with its “unworldly imperatives.”53  For example, the injunction of 
Matthew 19, 21:  “’resist not him that is evil with violence.’”  Lo, “the politician,” Weber 
unhesitatingly counters, “must abide by the opposite commandment: “You shall use force 
to resist evil, for otherwise you will be responsible for its running amok.”54  The practical 
implications of Weber’s radically polytheistic ethic for politics are said (by Weber) to be 
such that “Machiavelli’s Prince is harmless in comparison.”55   
Thus, contrary to what Walzer’s “Protestant” appellation might connote, Weber 
elaborates at some length in both of his “Vocation” lectures a political ethic which can 
never be reconciled to any  theodicy – unless it be that of the Hindu.  Indeed, Weber 
explicitly derives the very notion of a “vocation” as he employs from the dharma of a 
caste as taught in the Vedas.  Weber pulls from the Bhagavad Gita the nostrum that doing 
whatever work is necessary, even according to the duties of a warrior, “does not detract 
from religious salvation but contributes to it.”56  But this superficially encouraging 
reference, likely offered to temporarily cushion the impact of Weber’s uncompromising 
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heresies on his audience, seems clearly more than this detached surveyor of all religious 
phenomena can himself believe.  
No traditional martyrdom is in the offing for the Weberian leader as he rescues a 
disenchanted world.  His salvific deed is precisely not redeemed by its consequences.  
Despite what may be the tremendous benefits of his actions, they remain damnable for 
him.  There is no way around this.  And, what is worse, he knows this going in.   As 
Walzer points out, “His choices are hard and painful, and he pays the price not only while 
making them but forever after.”57  Machiavelli could profess to Vettori that “I love my 
native land more than my soul,” this could be read as simply a particularly exuberant 
effusion of civic humanist pride.58  But when Weber describes his leader as having made 
“a satanic pact” with a “demon of politics” who “lives in an inner tension with the God of 
love,” clearly his leader is striking some bargains that are unlikely to leave his rest 
undisturbed.  The compromises made by the Weberian leader are completely Faustian – if 
indeed heroic, that is, only tragically so.   
In the final paragraphs of Weber’s address a tonal shift becomes palpable.  He 
who would be a leader in the world of Weber must also be a hero who can “arm 
themselves with that staunchness of heart that refuses to be daunted by the collapse of all 
their hopes.”59  Even while reaching out to “to grasp the spokes of the wheel of history,” 
the Weberian leader must maintain “an inner calm and composure,” and “forge a unity 
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between hot passion and a cool sense of proportion.”60   Above all, Weber’s heroic leader 
must remain clear-eyed as “to the tragedy in which all action is ensnared, political action 
above all.”61  At this emotional climax of the lecture, it seems the lonely plight of the 
dutiful Weberian leader has earned a measure of pity.  Weber divulges his personal 
admiration for those who accept a political vocation, mindful of its demands, without 
suffering “an inner collapse.”  At the moment of accepting responsibility for the 
consequences of his actions, and bearing this responsibility “with his entire soul,” Weber 
asserts that such “authentically human” courage “cannot fail to move us.”62   
A little more Weberian anguish would not ill-suit the Machiavellian magistrate 
for Walzer’s sensibility; the poignant ethical “self-awareness” on the part of leaders 
Weber is found to evokes is said by Walzer to be “obviously of great value”63  But it is 
not enough.  In fact, insofar as Machiavelli ultimately relies solely on the personal 
prudence of leaders, between he and Weber is a distinction without a real difference. That 
Machiavelli’s advice has been subject to abuse hardly seems to require demonstration.  
Walzer does not concur that “prudential control” can substitute for “explicit reference 
back to the moral code.”64  And Weber adds little more than that the leader will 
“scrutinize the realities of life ruthlessly” and “measure up to them inwardly.”65  Thus, 
Weber’s “suffering servant,” for all we are able to know, may prove a ruthless Ahab-like 
obsessive, who has real trouble distinguishing to objects of personal zeal from the goals 
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of common welfare.  By drawing the curtain on his tragic hero at a peak of suspense on 
the scene of his protagonist’s agonized brooding in the lonely citadel of power, Weber’s 
own portrait proves leaves far too many questions in the minds of his audience.  Walzer 
remains uncomfortable counting solely on the Faustian probity of the leader in moments 
of crisis.    
What Walzer finds unsatisfactory about both the heroic Weberian approach to 
‘dirty hands’ and the Machiavellian approach is that they leave the dirty-handed leader 
himself to “fix the price” for his own wrongdoing.66   In sum, Machiavelli’s Prince “has 
no inwardness,” while Weber’s tragic hero has too little besides inwardness.  The one is 
content to “bask in his glory,” whereas the other leaves behind “a record of his 
anguish.”67   Given he realizes that the nobility of his leader’s intentions is not all that 
matters, but that his effectiveness and sense of proportion in adjusting often unpalatable 
means to whatever ends necessity requires are at least equally vital, Walzer’s analysis 
finds a need for some way notion such proportion can be measured.  Neither the 
“Protestant” nor the “neoclassical” tradition can, to Walzer’s satisfaction, account for a 
simultaneous recognition by the leader who commits ‘dirty hands’ of the rule he has 
violated.  Thus incapable of resting content with the abeyance of rules, Walzer’s thinking 
about ‘dirty hands’ in “Political Action” circles back to the essential question:  to what 
rule is the exception in ‘dirty hands’ decisions an exception?  Walzer proceeds to bear 
down on the tricky distinction so critical to his argument between “overriding” and all 
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other forms of violation. His dissatisfaction with the other two models for dealing with 
‘dirty hands’ leads Walzer, by the end of “Political Action,” into speculation about 




IV  The Dilemma Refused:  Camus 
Enter Albert Camus stage left.  And there does he loiter, dead center in Walzer’s 
argument.  Arriving in trench-coated garb, Camus would at once seem the most aptly 
attired for our stake-out of blind alleys. But Walzer’s election, from among centuries of 
eligible moralists, of Albert Camus as his exclusive representative of casuistry and the 
“Catholic” perspective seems doubly odd, in that Camus was neither a practicing 
Catholic nor in any obvious way inclined to what might be conventionally known as 
“casuistry.”  If the main sense of “casuistry” upon which Walzer relies turns centrally on 
excuse-making, it is hard to imagine a moralist with less patience for excuses than 
Camus.  “When excuses are made,” Camus asks, “are they not also incalculable errors 
since they may justify the very crimes we want to fight?”68    Apart from the curiosity of 
even invoking the name of Camus in relation to the project of “Political Action,” 
Walzer’s highly selective reading of the single work of Camus he cites is easily the most 
eccentric component of his essay as a whole.  And yet Walzer merely reiterates the same 
citation, with no greater elaboration, fifteen years later in “Emergency Ethics,” adducing 
no further analogies at the pivotal juncture.69     
Walzer states the advantage of the “casuistry” he attributes to Camus as its ability 
to require “us at least to imagine a punishment or a penance that fits the crime and so to 
examine more closely the nature of the crime.”70  Walzer’s own examination of the 
nature of the crime committed in Les Justes itself, however, is cursory at best.  Regarding  
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Les Justes, Walzer only quotes the preface, but takes its sublime mockery at face value.  
But it is Walzer’s assimilation of the attitude of Hoerderer in Les Mains sales with that of 
Camus himself which constitutes the greatest interpretive atrocity.  To be sure, parallels 
between the ideas of Hoerderer (and to some degree Sartre himself) and those of a 
character like Stepan in Les Justes are very much present.  Indeed, this is precisely the 
point.  But Walzer’s seeming failure to notice that Camus’ play is a scathing riposte to 
the Stalinist casuistry of Sartre and his set, growing contempt for which finally severed 
the famous bond of friendship between the playwrights, is nearly criminal.71   
Fatigued by the polemics and counter-polemics of the post-war French 
intelligentsia, Camus peeled back behind Marxism to the radicalism of a different era, 
focusing his studies on the Russian nineteenth century.  But this search for historical 
analogies and antecedents was not antiquarian in intent.72  Sergei Nechaev “carried the 
Utilitarian component of ‘rational egoism’ to its farthest extreme by advocating a total 
Machiavellianism – on which included, not only deception and falsity against one’s 
enemies, but also against friends and allies if this became necessary for the cause.”73 
Dostoevsky’s Demons fictionalized a murder committed by a young university student in 
1869 under the influence of Nechaev.  Camus admired Dostoyevsky’s novel enough to 
author his own stage adaptation in 1959.  Camus quotes Bakunin’s take on Nechaev in 
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The Rebel:  “He has gradually come to the conclusion that to found an indestructible 
society, it must be based on the politics of Machiavelli and the methods of the Jesuits:  
for the body, only violence, for the soul, deception.”74  Very much on the model of 
Demons, Les Justes lightly fictionalizes a factual episode from Russian history, the story 
of the assassination of Grand Duke Sergei Alexandrovitch.  Camus was taken by the 
narrative of this event in the memoirs of one of the members of the combat wing of the 
Russian Socialist party who helped carry it out.75   So closely did Camus follow the first-
person account of this co-conspirator  that he even kept the name of the actual bomb-
thrower, Yanek Kalieyav.   
The main characters of Les Justes come across as somewhat cloddish amateurs in 
the mold of the wily and charismatic party boss Hoerderer of Les Maines sales.  Much of 
the drama’s rising arc consists of pedantic speechifying exchanged by the members of a 
cell as they strive to stoke each other’s courage to carry out an assassination they see as 
essential to the social change they are determined to bring about -- regardless of how 
many innocents thereby perish:  “Not until the day comes when we stop sentimentalizing 
about children will the revolution triumph, and we be masters of the world.”76   As the 
curtain rises on the second act, a shamed initiate returns from his failure to carry out his 
assigned part on a fateful day. He could not bring himself to throw the bomb at the Grand 
Duke as planned, because he noticed the Grand Duchess and her niece and nephew in his 
company.  Kaliayev is, to this point, a failed revolutionary, because he is still in love with 
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things like life, beauty and happiness.  He sees his fight to overthrow despotism as a 
“revolution for the sake of life,” intended to extend the enjoyment of such values to all 
mankind.77  
Stepan, his more doctrinaire comrade, answers Kaliayev that the true 
revolutionary must rank justice higher than life, because, by his acts of destruction he is 
building up “a world in which there will be no more killing,” and by his criminality he is 
making it possible that “at last the innocent, and only they, will inherit the earth.”78 
Stepan urges Kalieyev to shut his eyes to innocence – “and to shut others’ eyes to it, for 
the time being – so that one day it may have a world-wide meaning.”79 A third comrade, 
Dora, wavers even more than Kaliayev, wondering if “Even in destruction there’s a right 
way and a wrong way – and there are limits.”80 Camus’ message relies on the darkly 
comic hollowness and self-deception of these justifications, not their self-regarding valor.  
Many lines of the play might lend themselves to being declaimed with the inflections of 
arch melodrama. 
As our story resumes: initially unwilling to follow through on his assigned task in 
the assassination, due to the coincident danger he spots just as he is about to do so to 
three innocent bystanders, two of them children, Kaliayev, after being subjected to the 
recriminations of his cohort for what they see as his lack of resolve, and much pondering 
of his mission, at last summons the courage to kill the Grand Duke -- and succeeds in 
doing so on a second outing.  He is then arrested and sent to prison.  While in prison, 
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Kaliayev is visited by Skouratov, the chief of police.  Skouratov applies to Kaliayev, 
psychological pressure from successive angles.   No one questions that Kaliayev killed 
the Grand Duke.  But Skouratov offers a pardon to Kaliayev – on the sole condition that 
he will confess that he committed an act of “murder,” not an act of “revolution.”  Since 
they are talking about the same thing, Skouratov offers to give Kaliayev back his life if 
only he will cooperate with this small piece of casuistry.  What is the point of hanging on 
something which is “just a word about which one might wrangle endlessly?” the 
interrogator inquires, sounding reasonable enough.81   The moral reality of killing another 
person will remain unchanged; the proposal is to simply call murder what it is.   
But Kaliayev refuses the police chief’s offer, proudly clinging to moral purity 
according to the logic of his own radicalism. Only revolution is justified murder, 
according to the steadfast convictions of Kaliayev, because only parties and ideas have 
the right to kill, not individuals.   Kaliayev stubbornly adheres to this thesis as the only 
possible vindication available to him, refusing the terms of Skouratov’s pardon, and even 
withstanding a subsequent threat that he will be posthumously slandered to his comrades 
as a traitor despite the true fidelity about which they will be kept in the dark as retaliation.  
In short, despite the life-saving mercy he showed three strangers at a critical moment, 
Kaliayev remains the prisoner of a death-dealing instrumental morality at the grim 
conclusion of Les Justes, and receives no mercy from his jailers or himself … finally 
heading willingly and defiantly to his own death.  Suddenly liberated from her previous 
reservations by news of Kaliayev’s death, Dora, for her part, is catapulted into terrorist 
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ecstasy, proclaiming on behalf of her fellow revolutionaries “the day of our justification.”  
Kaliayev’s calm march to the scaffold was all it took, says Dora, “to plunge him back 
into the carefree joy of childhood.”82  
The playwright hastens to clear up misunderstandings he feels many have brought 
to the play in his “Author’s Preface.”  It would be incautious, however, to receive these 
sly didactic notes as if they are in fact as straightforwardly helpful as the artist pretends – 
rather than constituting his seizure of one final opportunity to twist the knife of 
provocation.  There are limits to action, Camus declares flatly.  But “our world today 
seems loathsome for the reason that it is made by men who grant themselves the right to 
go beyond those limits.”  “Justice,” states Camus, “serves as an alibi, throughout the 
world, for the assassins of all justice.” Action can be “good and just” according to 
Camus, when it either “recognizes those limits,” or, “if it must go beyond them, at least 
accepts death.”  This would suggest that, like Dora, Camus himself sees something 
redemptive in Kaliayev’s death – though for a different reason.  Taking Camus’ analysis 
literally, suicide compensates for murder; the problem is those who go beyond the limit 
which prohibits killing “without dying themselves.”83  
But the action of Camus’ play in no way bears out the soothing homily of his 
ventriloquism as stage manager.  Kaliayev’s death is tragic.  Only in the minds of the 
deluded (like the grief-stricken Dora) does it miraculously usher in the wordly reign of 
justice and innocence they and their confederates would sacrifice anything – and kill 
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anyone – to achieve.  The core mistake of Walzer’s interpretation of Les Justes is to take 
the ironic sentence Camus pronounces against those who, in their own minds are “just 
assassins” with a earnestness that is deadly twice over.   
Indeed, the irony of Camus’ The Just Assassins is embedded in the very title of 
the work.  Such  admiration as Camus harbors for his characters is, in all candor, clearly 
based on not on justice, but his well-known ideal of absurdity.  “The absurd man thus 
catches sight of a burning and frigid, transparent and limited universe in which nothing is 
possible but everything is given, and beyond which all is collapse and nothingness.  He 
can then decide to accept such a universe and draw from it his strength, his refusal to 
hope, and the unyielding evidence of a life without consolation.”84   
Of the so-called heroes of The Just Assassins, Walzer says only that “having 
killed, they are prepared to die – and will die.”  “Dying,” he continues, “they need to 
make no excuses.”  Kaliayev needs no excuses because, by the astonishingly superficial 
terms of Walzer’s reading, his self-willed death is an adequate “self-punishment and 
expiation.”85  So falls the curtain.  But can anyone in the audience really be satisfied with 
Walzer’s conclusion?  Resting a commendation of casuistry on the outcome of Camus’ 
play is an exceedingly risky gambit for Walzer’s argument.   
While a certain forlorn grandeur might be rescued from the plight of Kaliayev, 
this verdict could count, at most, as a kind of poetic justice.  But this is not what Walzer 
said he was after.  Rather, it was, again, the meeting out of  “a determinate penalty” for “a 
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determinate offense.”   “Casuistry” is linked, both historically and in Walzer’s explicit 
use of the term, to “questions of degree.”86  It is not clear where such questions could find 
an opening in actions as unqualified as those of Kaliayev.  Assassination is infamously 
the most indeterminate of crimes, given its usually far-reaching and always unforeseeable 
long-term costs.  And though the act of suicide is certainly not uncommonly regarded as a 
self-inflicted punishment, given, from one point of view, its metaphysical finality, and, 
from another, its social evasiveness, it can pay for nothing – precisely insofar as it can be 
willed, by tortured souls, for practically anything.  In the extraordinary circumstances 
faced by Kaliayev, his death sentence does not become less unjust at the point at which 
he decides to cooperate with it.   Common sense would contradict the ironic judgment of 
Camus which Walzer accepts as if in earnest: the deliberate takers of innocent life do not 
undo their wrong by taking their own, but only multiply it.    
Is the redemption of casuistry, with promised application to high-stakes  realms of 
foreign and domestic policy in modern democracies, so easily obtained by valorizing the 
madness of a suicidal assassin?  At a minimum, although there may be some other 
interpretive logic whereby Walzer can rehabilitate his argument, it would require a much 
closer reading of Les Justes that he offers in “Political Action.” To validate the 
slipperiness of casuistry in addressing moral dilemma in politics requires more solid 
footing than the vortex of this subtle and arresting work of literature can provide Walzer 
all by itself.    If it is possible to find a casuistry which holds the “sensible doctrine” 
Walzer sees in it, further excavation is in order.   
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For in a certain light, it might be difficult to imagine a less auspicious basis for a 
revived justification of means by ends than Camus’ Les Justes.  The fate of the lead 
characters in these works is to realize too late the vanity of their plans, and to come to 
understand that if the means they have so agonizingly chosen is permitted – it is only 
insofar as the end on which they have staked everything is void.  
Explaining his refusal to kill the Arch Duke as planned, Kaliayev asserts:  
Killing children is a crime against a man’s honor.  And if one day the revolution things fit to break 
with honor, well, I’m through with the revolution. If you decide that I must do it, well and good; I 
will go to the theatre when they’re due to come out – but I’ll fling myself under the horses’ feet.87 
 
But his comrade Stepan heaps scorn on Kalieyev’s principles.   “It’s killing for 
nothing, sometimes, not to kill enough,” he reasons according to a revolutionary 
casuistry of magnificent concision.  “Squeamishness is out of place in work like 
ours. We’re murderers, and we have chosen to be murderers,” he states.  “Honor,” 
Stepan insists, is “a luxury reserved for people who have carriages-and-pairs.”      
“No,” comes the reply from Kaliayev, honor is “the one wealth left to a poor 
man.”     
If the protagonist of Les Justes experiences a redemptive moment, it is not 
his melodramatic demise in Act IV – in which his final refusals – to publicly 
repent, to call murder by its name, to betray his comrades or renounce the dogma 
to which they are frantically devoted – are all equally futile elements of his 
downfall.     Kalieyev’s refusal to kill the innocents in Act II is his sole moment of 
clarity; the fleeting realization of a non-consequentialist scheme of value.   
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Camus himself, speaking as a public intellectual of his time, found occasion to 
condemn Arab terrorism in the form in which he witnessed it.  But he also inveighed 
against both torture and the death penalty as responses to terror as unqualified 
abominations, and precisely in terms of an “honor” which renounced all 
consequentialism:  
Torture has perhaps saved some, at the expense of honor, by uncovering thirty bombs, but at the same time it 
aroused fifty new terrorists who, operating in some other way and in another place, will cause death of even 
more innocent people.  Even when accepted in the interest of realism and efficacy, such a flouting of honor 
serves no purpose but to degrade our country in her own eyes and abroad.88 
 
Much more recently, Jean Bethke Elshtain’s blithely attempts to appropriate the 
aura of Albert Camus in support of her own jihad, taking apparent encouragement from 
Walzer’s invocations of his name in “Political Action,” and seeks to enlist him in a war in 
which such passages strongly suggest he would find no common cause.  Though all the 
manifestos of this learned political theorist are worthy of careful re-examination, even 
apart from their plentiful references to both Walzer and Camus, our reading of them 
might be chastened at its outset by Camus’ own stated refusal to engage in “a casuistry of 
blood,” a pastime in which he insisted “an intellectual cannot become involved … unless 
he takes up arms himself.”89  
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V   The Dilemma Disguised:  Casuistry 
Proceeding with Walzer through his three models for explaining ‘dirty hands,’ it 
at first seems that Weber might provide a way for the leader to conceive her own mission 
in a manner less two-dimensional than can be derived by relying on Machiavelli alone.  
“A politician with dirty hands needs a soul,” Walzer observes, “and it is best for us all if 
he has some hope of personal salvation, however that is conceived.”90  Although a more 
thorough reception of Weber’s counsel in “Politics as a Vocation,” immensely 
complicates the paraphrase Walzer places in Weber’s mouth, it is impossible to approach 
“Political Action” in its initial presentation of ‘dirty hands’ from any vantage without 
taking its own unique employment of religious categories seriously.  Walzer makes 
repeated reference to what he takes to be the politically salutary effects of moral guilt, 
and indeed seems to commit to the view that some capacity for this condition is an 
essential accompaniment for an adequate reckoning with the ‘dirty hands’ phenomenon. 
And though he seems deliberately nonchalant about associating this guilt with a variety 
of perspectives equally capable of producing it in the aftermath of a ‘dirty hands’ crisis 
(i.e., “however that is conceived”) the echoes of religious worldviews certainly 
reverberate throughout Walzer’s essay.   
What Walzer states to most admire in the “Catholic” view is that dirty handed 
politicians pay “a determinate penalty” for a determinate crime.91  But Walzer’s 
appreciation for corollaries of what he calls “casuistry” is not simply political as opposed 
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to ethical, because he clearly covets from religion the ability to enforce morality other 
than by the implements of statutory law.  As a good Machiavellian, Walzer seems to 
presuppose the ability of the good politician who knows how to be bad to subvert the 
limitations of the constititutional state in service to his noble ends.  “Moral rules are not 
usually enforced against the sort of actor I am considering, largely because he acts in an 
official capacity.”  Thus, Walzer resigns himself to the conclusion that for the sort of 
rule-breaker he is writing about, “There seems no way to establish or enforce the 
punishment.  Short of the priest and the confessional, there are no authorities to whom we 
might entrust the task.”92  Such statements should alert us to the merits of attempting a 
reconstruction of Walzer’s argument by probing the history of moral discourse in 
Western religious history in a way which does not leave his whole invocation of 
“casuistry” resting on the unsuitably abyssal ground of Camus’ Les Justes.   
And indeed, the long half-buried tradition known as “casuistry,” if it can be 
recuperated at all, surely demands a genealogy stretching far before Camus – to the 
extent, here contested, that it can be said to culminate in his work at all.  Walzer touches 
down in “Political Action” closest to this story’s point of origin in a reference he makes 
to Augustine’s “melancholy soldier.”   The implied footnote is to Chapter 7 of Book XIX 
of the City of God.  Even in a necessary war, Augustine states there, a wise man called to 
fight “reflects with sorrow upon these evils so great, so horrid, and so savage,” and must 
confess “that he is miserable” – making him for Walzer an ancient model of the 
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conscientious agent who does knowingly does wrong in order to do good. 93   Walzer 
goes on to speculate that “Augustine did not believe that it was wrong to kill in a just 
war, just sad. … But he might have thought it wrong to torture in a just war.”94  
Walzer’s statement in this connection is misleading on two counts.  For one, 
Walzer stops short of mentioning that for Augustine it might not be wrong even to kill in 
an unjust war.95  The second half of Walzer’s statement (“he might have thought it wrong 
to torture in a just war”)  conveys another  questionable interpretation of the primary 
texts.  Though never addressing the wrongfulness of torture in war, Augustine did at 
some length provide the same cover of sanctification through melancholy for someone 
who tortures even those whom he knows to be innocent in the routine course of meting 
out the rather paltry fifth century version of due process.  In the chapter of City of God 
just preceding the one to which Walzer makes reference, Augustine zooms in on a man 
who “hates the necessity of his own actions … as a mark of human wretchedness.”  This 
describes the predicament of a typical judge in the courts of Augustine’s times, as he 
describes it.  Not only may the wise judge find it his job to torture “innocent witnesses in 
a case which is no concern of theirs.”  He must regularly face another sort of calamity to 
be even more loudly bewailed (though accepted as necessary and unhesitatingly 
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performed):  torturing a person accused in the very attempt to vindicate the accused, 
making this individual suffer “for a doubtful crime, a punishment about which there is no 
shadow of doubt, and not because he is discovered to have committed it, but because it is 
not certain that he did not commit it.”  Such situations make inevitable  
the fact that the judge tortures the accused for the sole purpose of avoiding the execution, in 
ignorance, of an innocent man; while his pitiable lack of knowledge leads him to put to death, 
tortured and innocent, the very person whom he had tortured to avoid putting the innocent to death. 
Now if this accused has followed the wisdom of our philosopher friends in choosing to escape from 
this life rather than endure those tortures any longer, he confesses to a crime he has not committed.  
Then after his condemnation and execution the judge still does not know whether it was a guilty or 
an innocent person he has executed, after torturing him to avoid executing the innocent in general. 
 
Augustine can only pine that if only “it were possible,” the personal agony the 
magistrate feels at the double-bind of this loophole in the reigning systems of legal 
inquiry would be “washed away by floods of tears.” 96 But of course, it is not possible for 
him to withhold any of the physical agony he must apply to the accused; all the torturing 
and executing Christian judge can do is pray, grit his teeth, and proceed.  In this sense,  
he does offer one of the earliest exemplars for the use of anguished hand-wringing and 
fretful brooding as the recommended palliative for the many situations  of ‘dirty hands,’ 
where “doing right” will mean a political agent “knows he is doing wrong.”97   Thus 
might Augustine’s weeping judge, more than the melancholy soldier Walzer cites instead, 
embody the original exemplar for the leader with ‘dirty hands.’   
“From its earliest days,”  as Peter Sloterdijk recounts, “the message of salvation 
has been accompanied by an escort of threats predicting the worst for unbelievers.  
Certainly the gospel speaks of wanting to bring blessings to all sides; but Christian 
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militantism has wished the curse of heaven upon the unconverted from its inception.”98   
Sloterdijk places particular blame for the sharpest downturn in these developments on the 
“unflinching theological absolutism” of Augustine, holding “this most influential of all 
the church fathers” responsible for “the most unfathomable system of terror in the history 
of religion.”99  In his desperation to resist Roman cruelty, Augustine, explains Sloterdijk, 
overshot the mark, and “inflated the diabolical aspect of God to the point of sacred 
terrorism.” An epoch of bloodshed and woe through religious wars and persecutions was 
set in motion by Augustine, explains Sloterdijk:  “Because metaphysical terror inevitably 
translates into psychological, and ultimately also physical, terror, Augustine’s ungracious 
doctrine of grace contributed to raising the level of cruelty in the Christianized word 
through the gospel, rather than lowering it.”100  Lisa Silverman well describes the integral 
connection between this implacable logic of the legal and the theological doctrine of 
original sin Augustine did so much to promote:  “criminal procedure implied that only by 
bypassing the will, by eliciting testimony that is not willed, that is not the product of 
human intent, could pure truth be achieved.  Judicial torture therefore sought not only 
verbal testimony but also bodily evidence that escaped the willful control of the self.”101  
As referring to a particular set of techniques, “casuistry,” often misused, could be 
regarded as an umbrella term for several rhetorical devices.  Many dictionaries now 
simply list “sophistry” as a synonym – though this is certainly a term worthy of an 
independent etymology.  Nevertheless, association with terminological sleight-of-hand, 
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technical parsing, and superficial distinctions enabling misleading definitions seems fair.   
Generally regarded as enjoying its heyday from the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 to the 
Second Vatican Council (1962 – 1965), the roots of casuistry actually go back further.  
Biblical scholar Albrecht Alt traces casuistry to a distinction essential to comprehension 
of the law of the ancient Israelites.102  In contrast to the style of apodictic law, which 
“suggests an unconditional, categorical assertion of right and wrong,” casuistic law as 
found in Hebrew scripture, according to Alt, “defines a specific case, distinguishes it 
carefully from similar cases, and stipulates the legal consequences.” 103  
In founding the Society of Jesus, the first religious order of Catholic priests 
constituted as a military organization, Ignatius of Loyola asserted the necessity of 
accepting the maxim that “What seems to me white, I will believe black if the 
hierarchical Church so defines it” as an Archimedean point for his organizing mission, 
and presaged the heyday of casuistry properly speaking.104  In the hands of the early 
disciples of Ignatius, casuistry is valued as a means for mitigating obvious evils by 
measuring their distance from a posited absolute crime.   “Heresy” in the sixteenth 
century included as a charge more than wrong beliefs, and though heresies may never 
have brought death and destruction to innocents in the empirical terms in which we now 
measure such things, their perpetrators were viewed by the clerics who pursued and 
questioned them as responsible for a dreaded and slippery contagion which did endanger 
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the whole community, not just temporally, of course, but eternally.   The Jesuits 
eventually realized that the scale and complexity, not to mention the stakes, of the war 
they had undertaken required them to become political, in a way no religious order had 
been before, and to appeal to secular authorities to aid them in their fight, not for 
religious reasons, but for the good of the commonwealth.  “Heresy in other words was 
not merely a sin, but a crime with profound political implications, and therefore there was 
as good (or better) reason for punishing heretics as for punishing murderers, brigands, or 
forgers.”105   
The origins of modern casuistry lurk in a particularly fertile period in Western 
political history – that which might be said to mark the transition from the period 
conventionally described as medieval to what we know as modernity. Walzer resurrects 
this term without inspecting its heavy historical baggage the actual historical proximity of 
torture and casuistry as related cultural phenomena goes apparently unnoticed.  The 
significance of this omission is to elide the fact that fires lit at the feet of pyres to which 
victims of torture were bound gave rise in time to the smoke of casuistry as well.  In 
bringing back casuistry as applied -- in the second of the two main illustrations provided 
in “Political Action” -- to torture, Walzer might have recalled that these practices -- one 
physical and psychological, the other rhetorical and psychological, both religious -- lay 
cheek by jowl, or, as it were, tong by coals, on the same continent in the same culture in 
the same centuries.   
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Casuistry has always taken on the hard cases – like whether one could utter a false 
confession of being a witch to escape excruciating pains of torture without sending one’s 
soul straight to hell.  At precisely the point that it is linked to torture, casuistry also plants 
roots for the modern right against self-incrimination, a concept slowly reeled in from the 
dungeons the Inquisition.106  At this intersection, forming a chord of mercy to cast down 
to rescue individual penitents languishing in pits of mortal pain, the Jesuits crafted and 
promoted the ingenious doctrine of “mental reservation.”   This doctrine moved down the 
bar for veracity under interrogation.  It rationalized an opening for those being subjected 
to excruciating pains of torture to make a false confession (otherwise to have counted as a 
mortal sin against oneself).   
In other words, among their other excellent cultural accomplishments, the Jesuits 
squared the tangled circle of innocence, torture and truth which had left Augustine’s wise 
judge performing his duty in a “flood of tears,” bemoaning while he does so the 
“wretchedness of man” -- but embracing his cruelty as an ineluctable necessity.  In 
Walzer’s revisionist appropriation of casuistry, however, its powers actually serve to 
close off an escape from torture, embroidering a moral shield for interrogators instead, by 
suggesting how public officials who give the okay to torture can be protected from 
excessive blame.  Granted, this move also is not without precedent:  After popularizing 
the arts of casuistry, the Jesuits established themselves as the confessors of choice for 
French royalty; this did less, over time, to enhance their popularity than to exacerbate 
their ignominy.   
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In terms of their ethical philosophies, however, casuistic tools were initially 
important to the Jesuits and their allies less in order to rationalize their methods of 
combating heretics and infidels than to help relieve the pressure of some of the clergy’s 
normal sacerdotal duties.  Casuistry generated excuses which helped pastors adjust the 
magnitude of lesser sins which, judged from an overly rigorous perspective, could sow 
disunity and discouragement among the ranks of the faithful.  By skillfully lowering the 
bar for repentance and reunion, casuistry prevented a needless preoccupation with minor 
personal sin which enabled stronger solidarity in cleansing external redoubts of the foe.  
Theologically, the Jesuits spliced together a missionary dedication to absolute justice and 
complete orthodoxy with a tolerant appreciation for degrees of individual culpability.  
This movement responded to the pressures of excessive moral rigor, even though it also 
in time became a cause of scandal within the Church.  Most often regarded as a rhetorical 
art, casuistry could also be seen in the hands of the Jesuits as part of a proto-modern 
moral science: Though strategically retrieving some of the most ancient notions in the 
western tradition, of sin as conceived through metaphors of filth and defilement, the 
Jesuits were cautious about allowing the cure to become worse than the disease, making 
room for a meliorist moral hygiene.107   
Early modern casuists are often credited with inventing the case-study approach 
for testing moral rules.  In fact, apart from the more remote ancestors excavated by Alt, 
these early modern casuists were the more immediate inheritors of a vast catalog of cases 
and doctrines from the reference manuals of scholastic confessors.  The case-study 
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method popularized by the casuists of the early modern period subverted conventions by 
approaching ethics through a logic as inductive as deductive.  The genius of casuistry was 
to open the possibilities of proceeding from cases back to principles.  Casuistry begins 
with a specific instance of prohibited conduct under a general principle, subjecting this to 
controversy.  Analogies are multiplied with examples of accepted conduct until a revision 
of the rule just large enough to embrace the initial case seems warranted.     
The goal of the most celebrated cohorts of casuists was to take inflexible and 
abstract principles and translate them into more reasonable guides for human action.  The 
premise was that it is always legitimate for confessors to seek to meet penitents, as it 
were, half-way – in respect of a stated propensity of the human psyche to grow needlessly 
and counter-productively discouraged in its journey of moral progress by comparison 
with an oppressively austere standard of perfection.  Special factors for the mitigation of 
faults were located in considerations of the time, place, motive and intention of sinful 
acts.  A classic example of where casuistry might have gained a solid toehold in the 
ecclesiastical codes of a growing church:  suppose a priest inadvertently substituted one 
or two words other than those prescribed while performing a baptism?  Would the 
sacrament thereby be rendered invalid?  At the point of such quandaries, casuistry, 
standing ready to rescue orthodoxy and the souls of infants at one stroke, could be called 
in by the authorities.108   
Early critics identified in casuistry the hazard that a certain fluency with the 
categories of moral analysis could itself facilitate obfuscation and opportunism rather 
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than sound judgment.  These critics, often baffled by the sophistication of casuist 
reasoning, denounced the casuists as aiming always at moral laxity, giving license too 
readily to the heretofore illicit.    In general, it was the case-study prong of the casuist 
tool-kit that came in for the harshest ridicule.  More specifically, the method of 
“probabilism” which became favored by the Jesuits, in which a speculative proposition is 
driven to a certain conclusion through a kind of appeal to authority, offered too ripe a 
target for humor through satiric hyperbole for even some fideists to resist.  “Probabalism’ 
was actually indexed fifth on a spectrum of six methods for guiding conscience, a list 
which included (in descending order) the even less well-remembered systems of 
“absolute tutorism or rigorousness,” “mitigated tutorism,” the not-to-be confused 
“probabiliarism,” “aequiprobalism,” along with “probabilism” itself, and, finally, 
“laxism” (of which the proponents of probabilism were, of course, falsely accused).  
Probabilism, properly speaking, is the manner of evaluating opinions, especially in 
matters of morals, in which one may accept “the less sure and less probable opinion, 
provided its probability is true and solid.”109    
Publishing satirical dialogues under a penname (in recognition of the sway the 
Jesuit faction then held near the throne), Blaise Pascal essentially mounted a rebuttal 
through reductio – taking the process of ever-more-inclusive revision further than had the 
casuists themselves, resulting in a degree of latitude shockingly at odds with common 
sense and the received strictures of the gospel – and often quite laughable when inspected 
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closely and with a jaundiced eye, as in the parodic scenes narrated through Pascal’s 
Provincial Letters.110   
Despite the wretched state into which the reputation of casuistry has since fallen, 
something along very much the lines of the case-study component of casuistry (at least as 
divorced from the term which has now degenerated into a pejorative) probably does not 
appear to most people today as an invalid form of reasoning -- nor should it.  Indeed, 
though its near-total erasure of within the context of its original development is of long-
standing, casuistry has survived during the period of its eclipse as a religious practice in 
modern customs for interpreting secular law.   Absent a fuller account of these 
vicissitudes (toward which this section has offered at best the most cursory sketch-work), 
Perhaps it would somewhat cleanse the inherently murky waters of casuistry to postulate, 
at least provisionally, that there could be two casuistries.  Let us call them for the time 
being “casuistry 1” and “casuistry 2.”  Both forms of casuistry work from the notion of 
modifying a general rule in terms of the specifics of a given case.  Casuistry 1 
emphasizes maintenance of the rule by means of treating a particular set of such factors 
as warranting an exception in the rule’s application to the given case.  Casuistry 1, in 
other words, facilitates upholding the rule by a temporary sacrifice of consistency in a 
given case, but strives to minimize this.   Casuistry 2 looks for a way to upend or displace 
the rule, working back from an exceptional case to a permanent revision of the rule as it 
applies to all future cases.  The difference, like all things about casuistry, may be subtle.  
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It was at the end-state of rule-restatement, and extending the logic of this out to a 
reductio ad absurdum for satirical effect, however, that opponents of casuists found the 
most ammunition for scorn.  But fundamentally, casuistry 1 is a form of prudential 
judgment in application, whereas casuistry 2 amounts to ad hoc legislation.  
Both what I am calling casuistry 1 and casuistry 2 start from an intuition that in a 
certain situation, insisting on absolute compliance with the most applicable rule, given 
other factors present in this case, may be a greater source of injustice than finding greater 
flexibility. One thinks this calls for a new rule, and the other wants to stick with the 
current rule, but make adjustments in order to keep it viable.  The advantage of one is its 
capacity to dispel needless and paralyzing guilt, while the other carries the cost of 
potentially abetting the cover-up of genuinely nefarious deeds.  One would be the 
casuistry of excuses, confession and expiation -- while the other would the casuistry of 
rationalization.  
Which casuistry, then, does Walzer, in “Political Action,” intend?  Clearly 
enough, both.  And at this fork in the road, he would no doubt be content to rest.  His 
forbearance there is both the glory and the peril of his analysis.  Before we can know 
what is worth taking away from his abruptly inconclusive forbearance, an alternative  
reaction to ‘dirty hands’ situations may be woven together from between the lines of the 
story Walzer tells in “Political Action” which may turn out to have no need for the 
excuse-making potentials of casuistry after all.  But we might appreciate better the need 
to explore further in this direction after remembering the tale of an overt pursuit of 
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applied ‘dirty hands’ -- by one who seems ideally positioned to accurately intuit what 











VII  Casuistry Amok: Elshtain 
Nagel, Walzer, Hare and Brandt at least have in common the perception that they 
are each carving out a distinct answer to essentially the same question; they are having a 
debate.  “Reflection on the Problem of ‘Dirty Hands’” was prepared by Jean Bethke 
Elshtain in 2004 as a companion piece to Walzer’s essay when both were included, side 
by side, in an anthology of other, mainly (like Elshtain’s) new works.111  By the time 
Elshtain gets to the issue, it has more or less been settled, and the debate is over -- or so 
she would make it seem.  Walzer, contends Elshtain, basically had it right.  Adopting 
Walzer’s argument as her model, Elshtain does not hold up the analysis of “Political 
Action” for re-examination.  Her purpose, instead, is to apply its cardinal principles to 
what are said to be new illustrations, thereby demonstrating the continued salience of 
Walzer’s ideas, and establishing what she finds to be their indispensable value in making 
sense of contemporary moral dilemmas facing policy-makers and the public.  Even while 
claiming to share Walzer’s preference among “traditions of explanation,” Elshtain credits 
her “Christian ethical formation” as a necessary supplement for full explanation of how 
‘casuistry’ might work in addressing ‘dirty hands.’   
 Outrage over the conduct of the United States in warfare had lurked palpably in 
the background Thomas Nagel’s pursuit of clarifications in ethical theory in “War and 
Massacre.”  Over thirty years later, Elshtain is moved to undertake her “Reflection” out 
of impatience with another war’s critics.  In 2004, Elshtain retrieves the notion of ‘dirty 
hands’ that had been central to Walzer’s response to Nagel in another discussion both 
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topical and theoretical.  The central illustration in Elshtain’s essay is the case of a terrorist 
in captivity who might divulge information by means of which thousands of lives could 
be saved, but only through the use of unusually harsh interrogation tactics – or “what 
some might call ‘torture.’”112   
   After mentioning the positions of both Bentham and Kant, Elshtain writes at the 
beginning of her essay that she finds herself “standing with neither.”113   The pro forma 
lip-service of this opening citation of the Kant-Bentham split notwithstanding, by the end 
of the essay, Elshtain’s sympathies have emerged unambiguously on the side of the 
consequentialists.  If the logic of her argument did not ineluctably do so, Elshtain would 
betray her true colors by invective harsh enough to make the most strident utilitarian 
blush:  speaking of “moralistic ‘code-fetishim,’” “pietistic rigorism,” and “rule-mania.”114   
Elshtain’s prosecution of the ‘war on terror’ is momentarily interrupted by her lunge 
toward the specter of “deontology run amok.”115  Thus, Elshtain’s ethic unequivocally 
ranks a notion of the longer-term, greater collective good above a deontological priority 
on rights.  Bemoaning too-stringent rules, Elshtain seems to not notice how close she has 
slid towards the “rules of thumb” oft-favored by leading utilitarians like Rom Hare and 
J.C. Smart, an implement which may not inspire everyone whose finger-nails are gripped 
by pliers to breathe freely.116   When Elshtain turns to Dietrich Bonhoeffer, it is to take 
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from him the “key question,” which is “not ‘What is the right thing for me to do?’ but 
rather ‘What is to come?’”117  Elshtain presents the foregoing without the slightest 
indication she notices, though quoting a theologian, that she is citing utilitarianism 
chapter and verse.  She further obscures any distinction between her ‘neighbor-love’ and 
secular consequentialism by noting Bonhoeffer’s reverence for “Machiavelli and 
necessita.” All in all, Elshtain’s ‘neighbor-love’ turns out to be a version of 
consequentialism in gauzy disguise.   
The necessity of occasional employments of torture is Elshtain’s organizing 
illustration of the dilemma of ‘dirty hands’ in her “Reflection” piece. “Nowadays,” she 
whines, “we tend to moralize and to criminalize everything.”118   And this is no time to 
allow “indiscriminate moralism and legalism” to tie the hands of law enforcement, she 
continues, by robbing them of “necessary tools in an often violent and dangerous world.” 
119   Granted, this threat level alert is muted by the fact that Elshtain does not provide us 
with an example of “indiscriminate” moralism -- or show us what discriminate moralism 
would look like.  With or without such clear barometers, Elshtain is writing at what she is 
strongly convinced is a time to lighten up.   It is no season to be depriving ourselves, lest 
we be disarmed before grave danger.   After all, it is only torture we are talking about.  
Then again, perhaps it is not.   In the nick of time, a nifty new term arrives to facilitate 
relief of our needless scrupulosity, so we can cut back on forbidden activities without 
giving them up entirely.    
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Elshtain borrows from reporter Mark Bowden the phrase “torture lite.”120  As long 
as we “disaggregate” sufficiently in our understanding of the ethics of our situation, and 
prayerfully repent as we feel moved, Elshtain is more than willing to countenance the 
new interrogation tactics described by Mark Bowden’s reporting.121  Making a point here 
she stresses at greater length in her book-length study Just War Against Terror, fighting 
“a deadly and dangerous war against enemies who know no limits,” we must ensure we 
are not held back by too many of our own.122  Never say “never.”123  As with the 
phenomena of “lite” beverages and edibles on supermarket shelves, however, doubts may 
linger regarding the actual ingredients of “torture lite.”  And one wonders what the effect 
may be for those on the receiving end of this new product of leaving determination of the 
criteria for the label “lite” to the discretion of the retailer of interrogation rather than 
being held to accord with a uniform objective threshold.  
To reiterate:  Elshtain does not countenance torture in general, only what she also 
calls “Torture 2”124  And even when the okay must be given, she is against having torture 
“routinized.” 125  Elshtain’s article reproduces much of the graphic detail turned up by 
Bowden’s investigation.  But Elshtain’s purpose in raising these offenses toward our 
nostrils is not journalistic but rhetorical.   Her enumeration climaxes with description of 
actions on the part of captors she thinks her readers would be inclined to permit -- under 
                                                 
120 Ibid., 85. 
121 Ibid., 85, 83.   
122 Jean Bethke Elshtain, Just War Against Terror:  The Burden of American Power in a Violent World,  (NY:  Basic Books, 2003);   
Elshtain, “Reflection,” 80.   
123 Ibid., 77.  
124 Ibid., 87.   
125 Ibid., 84.   
 60 
the right circumstances.  By holding up grotesque example after grotesque example of the 
most despicable practices, Elshtain expects our revulsion at lesser atrocities to abate.  
Does sleep deprivation really rank with a severe beating?     
Elshtain chastises “human rights activists” who, she charges, “make mincemeat of 
the category” of torture by applying it to such actions as shouted insults, slaps in the face, 
and forms of merely psychological inhumane and degrading treatment.  With such 
“legalism,” according to Elshtain, these activists do “a disservice to the complexity of the 
matter.”126  One question Elshtain’s treatments of the topic leaves glaringly unanswered:  
if indeed, “there is no absolute prohibition to what some call torture,” what sort of 
prohibitions ought to be in force against what anyone might call torture?  Even accepting 
the word-play, when does torture stop being truly “lite” and turn toxic?  Alternatively, if 
we are to proceed with torture as necessary, with or without semantic discriminations, 
how will we then know how much torture is too much? Who is to say what is “an 
exceptional and truly extreme circumstance” -- when it starts and/or when it ends?127   
Elshtain draws no bright line.  And indeed it might be seen that this blurriness is precisely 
what makes the concept of “torture lite” useful to her in this essay.   
Philosophers should be called to account, Bernard Williams suggests, for the 
artificiality of the favored  devices in their thought experiments.  Fictional scenarios can 
too easily cooked up, made to order to prove a point.  Given that moral reality is seldom 
if ever so tidy, this ease is deceptive.  “The examples are inevitably schematized,” he 
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writes, “and they are open to the objection that they beg as many questions as they 
illuminate.”128  Moreover, such scenarios also confront philosophers who deploy them 
with two further intrinsic limitations:  First, “that, as presented, they arbitrarily cut off 
and restrict the range of alternative courses of action.”  In addition, “they inevitably 
present one with the situation as a going concern, and cut off questions about how the 
agent got into it, and correspondingly about moral considerations that might flow from 
that.”129   This self-conscious reflection on and qualification of the practice of 
philosophically-tailored scenarios could add support to Walzer’s argument, insofar as this 
move on Williams’ part underscores the areas of ambiguity that recommend a concept 
like ‘dirty hands.’  At the same time, however, it lays the basis for strong criticism of an 
argumentative strategy fundamental to defenses of torture as developed not only by both 
Walzer and Elshtain in their articles on ‘dirty hands,’  but by numerous other recent 
commentators on the ethics of torture as well.   
Specifically, a plump target for the charge of scenario abuse on which Williams 
trains his sights is surely the so-called “ticking time-bomb scenario” which has emerged 
as a nearly omnipresent staple in discussions the ethics of torture, including those of 
Walzer in “Political Action” and Elshtain in “Reflection.”  Nothing like the scene of a 
captured guerilla leader Walzer imagines in “Political Action,” after which a principled 
politician must jettison his convictions in order to save thousands of lives from certain 
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peril, has entered the public record since 1973.130  But this fact does not deter Elshtain in 
2004 from sparking up the time-bomb scenario once more.  In “Reflection,” Elshtain 
draws on her own context of contemporary global conflicts, but her only real revision of 
Walzer’s second of two scenarios in “Political Action” is to strip off the details with 
which Walzer embellished his telling of the tale.  The rehash this leaves her with is 
howlingly cartoonish:  “The villain is thoroughly villainous.  The probability that he 
knows where the bomb is planted is as close to certainty as human beings can be in such 
situations.”131  (And how certain, it seems fair to wonder, is that?)  These seemingly 
endless recyclings establish this intrinsically implausible scenario as a reliable invitation 
to precisely the sort of intellectual laziness the term “cliché” was invented to discourage.  
The universal popularity of the hypothetical narrative of the “ticking time-bomb” for the 
new casuists of torture reveals the usefulness of fiction where reality cannot be made to 
serve, given the scarcity of fact-sets at all resembling such a scenario within the actual 
documentary record of torture’s use.  The logic of the “ticking time-bomb” scenario is 
wholly constructed from two incredible premises: 1) that captors know that a certain 
captive knows the precise location of a bomb before they have begun coercively 
interrogating him, and 2) that they can be certain that methods of torture will prove a 
reliable method of extracting this information from the captive.132  
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The main ethical stances in the recent literature of torture have lined up along 
three basic reactions:  1) that, irrespective of circumstances, torture ought to remain 
absolutely prohibited; 2) that, subject to the fresh inquiries occasioned by the latest war, 
traditional bans on torture should be at least partially rescinded; and 3) that, while torture 
per se should remain off limits, certain unorthodox tactics at use in the present war could 
be embraced by a new category so as not to count as “torture.”  Elsthtain takes the third 
option – what Steven Lukes calls the “Orwellian version” of the consequentialist view.133   
Elshtain is made almost giddy at this potential opening to ply “the stock-in-trade of the 
moral casuist.”134  In classic casuistic fashion, Elshtain’s main concern while considering 
torture is neither with practices nor principles so much as “the word itself.”135  By the 
time she finally gets around to doing so, Elshtain defines “torture as the horrific practices 
about which no decent person has any doubts as to whether they constitute torture or not” 
– but, apart from the remarkable circularity of this formulation, the main project of her 
essay is to ponder situations regarding which there is an fact lively disagreement, among 
presumably decent people, about whether the acts in question constitute torture or not.136   
The first line of Jean Bethke Elshtain’s biography on the University of Chicago’s 
website identifies her as “one of America's foremost public intellectuals,” implying that 
whatever chores “public intellectuals” are assigned, they constitute for this professor 
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more than an avocation.137  Albert Camus articulated the vocation of the intellectual he 
took on as his own as the mission “to disintoxicate minds and to calm fanaticisms, even 
when this is against the current tendency.”138  Elshtain’ aims as an author, self-described 
“ethicist” and “public intellectual” in the post-911 phase of her career might be read 
rather differently.   
Central to Elshtain’s program in Just War Against Terror (to which the essay we 
have mainly considered can be viewed as a subordinate work) is the notion that a 
deployment of “fundamental theological and ethical concepts” offers weapons that are 
indispensable to the response demanded by the attacks of September 11, and she notes 
admiringly the well-stocked arsenal of Catholicism in this regard.139  After all, it is not as 
if “Christianity has no knowledge of the sword.”140   “One way or another, Christians, 
together with other citizens, face moments when they are asked:  Where do we stand?”141  
More specifically, the clearly most urgent question for Elshtain is:  “How, then, can a 
Christian take up arms?”142  And Elsthain’s answer is at the ready, her aim sure, for she 
can call to her aid both St. Augustine and John Wayne.143  “Are Christians not obliged to 
respond, even at the cost of dirtying their hands?” she asks.144  Otherwise, “Appeasement 
may flow from desperate miscalculation.”145   
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Writing in 2012, Elshtain authors an enlarged and in some ways sharpened 
restatement of her 2004 argument.  In “Varieties of ‘Violence,’: Thinking Ethically about 
the Use of Force in the War on Terror,” Elshtain scolds “sloppy thinking” which is guilty 
of “overusing and conflating terms such as violence, torture, and war.”146  The great 
superiority of Christian-American violence over Arab and Islamic violence Elshtain harps 
upon again and again is that their violence is indiscriminate whereas ours is reasoned, 
proportionate, and hemmed in by standards. “For just warriors,” Elshtain reassures reads 
of Just War Against Terror, “both aims and means are limited, even if one has been 
grievously harmed.”147   
“Sacralizing suicide, or homicide, or other evils would certainly be inconsistent 
with Christian doctrine, but soldiering is another matter.”148  By contrast, “The just war 
tradition requires that the philosopher, the moralist, the politician, and the ordinary 
citizen consider a number of complex criteria when thinking about war.”149   Elshtain 
herself often demonstrates to the detriment of the credibility of such distinctions, 
however, that moral standards, Jesuitically applied, can often be negotiated on a sliding 
scale.  As Talal Asad observes trenchantly in connection with Walzer: “The definition of 
war and terrorism as opposites makes it possible to speak of a war on terror and to 
assume that the state can conduct itself freely toward the terrorist precisely because he 
does not respect the law.”150  For example, elsewhere in Just War Against Terror, 
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Elshtain includes a telling qualification to the anodyne distinctions drawn in the passage 
quoted above:: war is the sort of thing, she adds, which “rarely admits of absolutes, and 
there are usually no bright lines separating alternatives” – after all, “public authorities are 
always compelled to act in a kind of fog.”151  Fog, again, is truly the oxygen of casuistry.  
And the incense that guarded the confessional may, oddly enough, bear some 
resemblance to the tobacco smoke drifting over the saloon doors through with the Duke-
like man of action boots the unruly, casuistry stuffed among other trusted weapons on his 
gun-belt.   
Though worthy of consideration in its own right,  Elshtain’s search for consensus 
with Walzer in her 2004 essay on ‘dirty hands’ is all the more interesting when read as an 
interregnum within large and on-going public disagreements between these two leading 
American political theorists over the same period –- which is to say,  against the 
backdrop of international conflicts that were far from theoretical.   As William J. Bennett 
writes in Why We Fight, “The military battle is one thing.  The battle of public opinion, 
over our airwaves and in our newspapers and journals, in our schools and churches, in 
our families, in our hearts, is another.”152   Alternatively, as Michael Walzer puts it In 
Just and Unjust War: 
It is important to stress that the moral reality of war is not fixed by the actual activities of soldiers 
but by the opinions of mankind.  That means, in part, that it is fixed by the activity of philosophers, 
lawyers, publicists of all sorts.  But these don’t work in isolation from the experience of combat, 
and their views have value only insofar as they give shape and structure to that experience in ways 
that are plausible to the rest of us.153  
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Weighing in on the national debate then underway about whether the United 
States should invade Iraq in the absence of an attack, and in the face of “scant evidence” 
of terrorist connections or the intent to use weapons of mass destruction, on August 15, 
2002, former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft makes the seemingly modest 
proposal that “we need to think through this issue very carefully.”154   On September 4, 
2002, former Secretary of the Navy James Webb cautioned, from the editorial page of the 
Washington Post that “wars often have unintended consequences.”155   On September 23, 
2002, 100 ‘Christian scholars of ethical theory,’ published a petition they had all signed 
in the Chronicle of Higher Education.   “As Christian Ethicists,” it read, “we share a 
common moral presumption against a preemptive war on Iraq by the United States.”156  
On September 29, Illinois Senator Dick Durbin held a press conference announcing his 
opposition to a pending resolution authorizing President Bush to use force in Iraq.157  As 
a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on October 1, 2002, Senator 
Durbin read the National Intelligence Estimate assessing the Iraqi threat.158  On October 
2, 2002, nearly 3000 people assembled on Federal Plaza in Chicago, Illinois.  At this 
rally, a letter of support was read from Senator Durbin.  A certain obscure state senator 
also took the occasion to clarify, “I don’t oppose all wars. What I am opposed to is a 
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dumb war. What I am opposed to is a rash war.”159  Ignoring Senator Robert Byrd’s 
prophecy that “The judgment of history will not be kind to us if we take this step,”160  on 
October 11, 2002, 77 U.S. Senators cast their votes in favor of S. J. Res. 45, 
Authorization For Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, over the 
objections of Senators Durbin, Byrd and 21 others.161 
It seems unlikely that Professor Jean Elshtain, then a resident of Chicago, was in 
Federal Plaza on October 2, 2002.  Perhaps she had not read the columns by Scowcroft, 
Webb or Byrd, and obviously was not persuaded by the public statements of one of her 
senators.  For on October 6, 2002, in the same week that Congress was debating what 
became Public Law 107-243, Elshtain published in The Boston Globe an editorial “A Just 
War?” answering the question in her title affirmatively.   In this Boston Globe editorial, 
Elshtain begins by trumpeting her status as “an ethicist and a Christian” to undergird the 
credibility of her political stance falling in line behind the Bush march to war.   She 
advertises the present statement as a banner hoisted over a just response to a war of words 
initiated against the President’s agenda, launched by a less patriotic rival band of ethicists 
from encampments such as the Chronicle of Higher Education.  She connects her 
willingness to endorse the Iraq invasion not only to her revelation about the evils of 
terrorism after September 11, 2001 which led to her, she says, “to play a central role in 
drafting a statement, ‘What We’re Fighting For.’”  She gives legs to allegations of a 
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connection between Al Qaeda and the Iraqi government itself, asserting that Saddam 
Hussein provided “substantial and material support” to Osama bin Laden.   
Referring to any plan of deterring Saddam’s development of weapons of mass 
destruction, Elshtain, catching the wave of a rising tide of belligerence, assumes the 
failure of such a plan.  Betraying not a hint of mental reservation, Elshtain adjusts the just 
war requirement to exhaust other options, trimming it back to a more workable 
stipulation that “other options have been explored.”   (And this, apparently, is a 
requirement which has been fulfilled -- five months prior to the UNMOVIC report to the 
Security Council).  Elshtain comes twice right to the verge of conceding that the Iraqi 
threat does not rise to the level of the classic ‘casus belli’ -- because, in her words, “Iraq 
has not attacked us directly, and it may never do so.”  However, she concludes that other 
factors unique to the situation obviate such a pretext.   This returns us to the opening 
proposal of the article: “to make a case for preventive or preemptive use of force” -- as if 
these two concepts were interchangeable in the just war framework.162 
By the end of “A Just War?,” in a style not unreflective of the Bush 
administration’s own protean public relations strategies, Elshtain will have presented 
rather a jumble of independent rationales, whose relation to one another, taken separately, 
may not be clear.  Elshtain’s initial portrait of the dangers facing America short of war 
against Iraq definitely appeal to prevailing sentiments of the time of generalized panic at 
the prospect of another terrorist attack emanating from the Middle East.  In the final 
paragraph of her editorial, however, Elshtain shifts her weight one last time, and places 
                                                 
162 Elshtain, “A Just War?”  in The Boston Globe.  October 6, 2002, 
http://www.boston.com/news/packages/iraq/globe_stories/100602_justwar.htm,   emphasis added.  
 70 
her foot squarely on what is revealed as for her the paramount concern:  “the Iraqi victims 
of Saddam Hussein.”   All other considerations aside, “just war theory demands that we 
consider them.”  Elshtain quotes from President Bush’s speech to the U.N., taking its 
claims seemingly at face value. After bewailing the threat of “isolationism” and insisting 
that Bush was acting multilaterally and with UN backing, Elshtain does show herself at 
least a few months ahead of the curve by casting the coming invasion primarily as a 
“humanitarian intervention.”  Factual references in this 2002 editorial do not enable 
readers to determine whether these are the victims in question are those felled by the 
well-known war crimes of the 1980s and 90s (and Elshtain does cite Samantha Power’s 
book on the atrocities of this period), the tortured or disappeared of Ba’athist prisons, the 
children who died due to shortages of food and medicine while Iraq was under UN 
sanctions, some other group – or all of these.  This uncertainty may not matter for 
Elsthtain’s argument in favor of intervention on humanitarian grounds, however, for it 
seems to be a prospective slaughter in Iraq that is of most concern to her.   “He will not 
hesitate to target civilians intentionally.  The only questions are when and where.”  The 
most relevant analogies for Elshtain in analyzing the Iraq of 2002 would be the “ethnic 
cleansing” of Bosnian Muslims and tribal genocide against Rwandan Tutsis in the 1990s.  
How, Elshtain asks, can we again stand by?  
Melissa Rogers presents Elshtain to her audience at the National Press Club on 
October 5, 2001 by listing among her credentials this imprimatur: “Her friend and 
colleague Michael Walzer calls her a truly independent, deeply serious, politically 
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engaged and wonderfully provocative political theorist.”163   Such celebrated affinities 
notwithstanding, in the succeeding months and years, the paths taken by these friends in 
evaluating US foreign policy sharply diverged.  All the “engagement” and “provocation” 
of which each might be capable could be found on full display.164   A dean of just war 
studies at least since her 1992 book on the subject, Elshtain is publicly sanguine about the 
US invasion of Iraq at the same time Walzer expresses his continuing desire “to see the 
inspection system work” and his strong belief in the need to oppose the Bush 
administration “and its doctrine of preemptive war” with an urgency just as palpable. 165  
At the Press Club event, Elshtain can be found making her debut as a member of an elite 
intellectual commando squad I shall henceforth refer to as “the just war casuists.”   
In a striking first-person exclamation in “Political Action,” Walzer confesses: “I 
don’t think I could govern innocently.”166  When, two weeks before US bombing of 
Baghdad begins, Walzer recommends a US “exit strategy” of extending no-fly zones, 
imposing “smart sanctions,” and pushing for an expanded UN monitoring system with 
more NATO troops -- knowing what he knew about the conduct of the Ba’athist regime – 
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he would surely not claim to be writing innocently.167  Elshtain’s own plan of action at 
the same time –green-lighting that of the Bush administration, and accepting its 
diplomatic and public relations chicanery at face value – seems worthy of equally candid 
evaluation.    
Participating in a panel at the Ethics and Public Policy Center on February 6, 
2003, William Galston, urging “clear thinking and honest deliberation about the real 
choice we face,” and taking pains to discourage “a redefinition of classic concepts,” 
patiently measures the impending invasion against just war categories.  He invokes the 
authority of Michal Walzer against more selective and creative interpretations which had 
by then already begun to circulate in the course of his remarks: 
Let me summarize a lot of legal and philosophical argument by suggesting that at the heart of the doctrine of 
justified anticipatory self-defense lie four criteria: (1) the severity of the threat , (2) the degree of probability of 
the threat,  (3) the imminence of the threat, and (4) the costs of delay.  Testing the Iraq case against these 
criteria, I think we would have to say that the threat is high, at least in the worst case; for example, the 
acquisition of the transfer of nuclear weapons to terrorists.  The probability of such an event is contested, and 
many experts believe Saddam does not have an incentive to do anything of the sort.  Anyway, in all probability 
we are not talking about a threat that is imminent, and the costs of delay -- at least when measured in months 
rather than years -- are rather low.  This led the most eminent student of modern war, Michael Walzer, hardly a 
dove regarding Iraq, to find the following conclusion: In the absence of evidence suggesting not only the 
existence of Iraqi weapons but also their imminent use, preemption is not an accurate description of what the 
president is threatening.  No one expects an Iraqi attack on the United States tomorrow or next Tuesday so there 
is nothing to preempt.  The war that is being discussed is preventive not preemptive.  It is designed to respond to 
a more distant threat.  Walzer goes on to note that international lawyers and just war theorists have never looked 
with favor on this argument, because the danger to which it alludes is not only distant but speculative, whereas 
the costs of a preventive war are certain and usually terrible.168   
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A concerted effort, in striking contrast to more sober interpretations like 
Galston’s, by leading public intellectuals to finesse the meaning of “a just war,” for the 
purpose of soothing the doubts of any sitting nervously on the sidelines, was one front in 
the larger campaign saturating the media in 2002-03.  This front was defined by an 
apparently at least somewhat coordinated campaign to mute the effect of explicitly ethical 
and religious opposition to the war being voiced from other quarters.169  Just war casuists 
like George Weigel, Robert George, Jean Elshtain and others worked vigorously to 
discredit Iraq critics as false claimants to the just war inheritance.  A climate of 
impending international war might seem a moment to summon all the resources of 
careful deliberation an intellectual tradition might provide.  Not so for the just war 
casuists.  Rather than holding up the “last resort” standard and asking the United States to 
adhere to it, however, the just war casuists argued that this standard was now obsolete.  
Grown restless under “the tired categories of another era,” his coterie of writers which 
included Elshtain demonstrated a clear resolve to perform the rear-guard action of 
clearing a path to a destination at which much governmental and some popular decision-
making had already arrived.170   A consistent theme throughout the wartime writings of 
this group:  that the time had come, in precisely the name of  “the just war tradition,” to 
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surpass the confining strictures of received just war thinking in favor of a more advanced, 
nuanced and holistic version.  Capturing the zeitgeist of much American intellectual 
debate preceding Operation Iraqi Freedom, James Schall gives center-stage to the 
concern that legitimate self-defense may be inhibited by an overly exhaustive analysis.  
Citing Elshtain, Schall conveys his impatience with views of war that might “prevent 
quick and decisive action” in response “to the new kinds of war that we see in the twenty-
first century.”171   “The just war theory,” Schall declares, “is relatively useless in this 
area.”172   
It was not without the efforts of this small but dedicated, well-placed and highly 
skilled troop of public intellectuals I am calling the “just war casuists” that the new 
“Bush Doctrine” found its voice.  The concept of “preventive war,” if not wholly 
original, was much enlarged by their handiwork from the form it had in any scholastic 
archive where it may have slumbered -- and came roaring to life as never before.  A 
souped-up notion of “preventive war” was rolled out with the specific intent of rendering 
the need to meet the criteria of the traditional understanding of just war theory obsolete, 
thereby opening wider a political path for the US attack on Iraq.  In its re-tooled model, 
“preventive war” debuted with enhanced features to allow for easier handling in those 
tight spots.  The logic of responding to asymmetric threats prompted a re-balancing of the 
just war tests.   Risks had to be treated as certainties; speculation accepted as truth.  A just 
“response” was now the anticipation of an attack, not a reply to one.  And once the 
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requirement of a true casus belli was jettisoned, away with it slid any framework as to 
how the aims of a war could be limited, and its means held proportionate.   In keeping 
with the hip, consumerist lingo of “torture-lite,” the re-boot might as easily have been 
branded “Just War 2.0,” or perhaps “Turbo Thomas.”   
Perhaps editorial staff of the Boston Globe hit upon the idea of accompanying 
Elshtain’s 2002 op-ed with a side-bar –a numbered list in different type-set of no fewer 
than seven just war criteria.  The inference could certainly be drawn by a casual reader 
that Elshtain was proceeding through the items in the side-bar list in the main columns, 
systematically comparing actions to criteria as she goes.  A careful reading of the quite 
complex adjoining text under Elshtain’s by-line, however, finds her engaged in a 
different endeavor, and obviously not sharing in the intention of the straightforward list 
reproduced in the box.  Elshtain broaches the topic of the just war tradition in order to 
introduce a new interpretation of its teachings.  Her maneuver entails shortening the 
received list and qualifying the remaining terms to update its stipulations for new times.  
The tension is sharp enough that at some point, the reader begins to wonder whether the 
editors appended the outer text-box as a sort of ironic counter-point to the main text, in 
the post-modern style of the formatting in Jacques Derrida’s Glas, for instance.   
Elshtain continues in 2006 and 2010 to uphold the central tenants of her 2002 case 
for the justice of the Iraq war.173  In the “Jean Bethke Elshtain Responds” portion of a 
2006 Dissent debate with Walzer, Elshtain queries:   
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But who knew for sure? Unless Clinton, Gore, Albright, and Prime Minister Tony Blair, as well as President 
Bush, were, or are, all ‘lying,’ there was sufficient compelling evidence of WMD to raise the level of concern 
and enhance the case for intervention.174 
 
This statement may raise, among others, the awkward question of just how much 
homework a “public intellectual” is obliged to perform.175  Moreover, it plainly commits 
to major fallacies taken by itself.  The assumption closest to the surface can be restated as 
another question:  if enough people make an assertion, does “sufficient compelling 
evidence” exists as to its validity?  The polemical counter-charge embedded in the 
imputed accusation of ‘lying’ is used to imply that any past mistakes in accepting the 
claims of others would have required the even more incredible presumption of lying on 
the part of all those (or at least a magic five) offering the claims.   But surely Elshtain is 
not implying that everything which could not be a lie (assuming that this is the case here) 
must be true, and taken for true, or accepted purely on the authority of whoever says it.  
By framing her question in an ostensibly rhetorical form, Elshtain trades upon the gnomic 
adage of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that “the absence of evidence is not the 
evidence of an absence,” with appropriate corollaries.  Defenders of this position pretend 
they only erred, if at all, on the side an abundance of caution.  
Writing about the Iraq war, Jean Elshtain’s deployment of the “just war” 
framework and terminology constitute a fine demonstration of casuistry, with all its 
liabilities.  In her general interest articles and a widely-reviewed book, joining other 
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publications during the same months during 2002-03 by like-minded authors of academic 
distinction, the impression is created of a mentality which has resigned itself in advance 
to work back from a judgment already rendered on a case at hand to a revised formulation 
of the relevant principles of evaluation.  To paraphrase: since it would be just to invade 
Iraq, it is time to revisit our criteria for what makes a war just.  If the components of this 
theory could only be disassembled and briskly rubbed together, so went the strategy, the 
resulting friction could ignite in the minds of readers a state of shock and awe.  
Elshtain’s most original contribution to the project of just war casuistry might be 
her trusty weapon of the hyperbolic “tick-list.”  She frequently uses this as a straw man 
alternative to the only sort of interpretation of the just war tradition that could be tenable.  
For example, in 2006 Elshtain begins by applauding Walzer for not falling for such 
simplistic enticements, with this favored term of phrase, for seeing that “the just war 
tradition is not simply a series of boxes to be checked.”176  In truth, the procedure of 
those who invoked the just war framework to legitimize the Iraq invasion never discarded 
the metaphorics of this proverbial “tick list,” however.  Their efforts, rather, were more 
analogous to introducing a new, fourth box in addition to the conventional three, and 
offering that checking this fourth box could be sufficient in lieu of squaring plans with 
any of the others.  Rather than continuing to accept Elshtain’s straw-man trope of the 
infamous “tick-list,” readers well informed on the subsequent history of Iraq, rather than 
chafing at the too-confining strictures of the just war tradition might be inclined to issue 
two cheers for tick-lists.  Perhaps applications of just war analysis to the impending Iraq 
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war might have navigated the dirty-hands forks in the road more skillfully with the 
addition of less casuistry rather than more.   The question is by this point inescapable:  in 
the Iraq “just war” debate, was it really the inherited yardstick which came up short (as 
once alleged), or the attempts to bend it?  Review of the work of the just war revisionists 
in light of what ensued in Iraq might enhance our appreciation of the value of fairly rigid 
moral frameworks in times of crisis.  On is led to the thought that, perhaps particularly in 
such high-stakes situations, a few steady compass points might do more good than harm.  
At the least, torture of prisoners and mass killing in warfare emerge as stronger 
candidates for apodictic injunction rather than casuistic exception. 
The full arsenal of Jean Elshtain’s well-honed intellectual armature apparently did 
not equip her to peer very far beneath the surface of government war-machine 
propaganda in the early 2000s.  But it is significant to the effort to take stock of her 
claimed fidelity to Walzer’s ‘dirty hands’ framework in all this that Elshtain has never 
recanted her original position regarding the imputed justice of the war.  Early in her 2002 
newspaper op-ed, Elshtain lays aside the reservation: “Don’t barge in and do more harm 
than good.”  Of course not.  And the obviousness of a matter from hindsight does not 
necessarily exonerate neglect of it before the fact.  Elshtain reportedly does now concede 
the possibility that there may have been a “prudential error” on the part of those who 
made the decision to go to war against Iraq, but makes this point in a way which seems 
make prudential considerations external to the original question of a war’s justice.177  It 
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should be needless to add, especially when considering the words of such an esteemed 
authority on the subject of the just war tradition, that this hedge elides the well-
established status of the evaluation of factors such as the likelihood of success and the 
premeditation of end-points to the question of the justice of a military intervention.     
Pulling in a distinction finely drawn by J.L. Austin, Walzer points out that “an 
excuse is typically an admission of fault; a justification is typically a denial of fault and 
an assertion of innocence.”178  Because excuses acknowledge fault, they sometimes 
constitute a good step in the direction of confession and repentance.  When there are no 
excuses, sometimes disingenuous justifications are made to fill in -- i.e., rationalizations.  
Rationalizations are the dark twin of justifications.  And sometimes casuistry can be 
exploited to help rationalizations along in a manner almost indiscernible from that with 
which it generates excuses.   Walzer unwisely discounts this possibility.  Especially when 
offered before-the-fact, casuistic rationalizations can short-circuit the process of excuse-
making – and thus any form of the public accountability Walzer wants -- later on.    
Though Jean Elshtain’s post 9/11 writings indeed constitute a majestic reminder 
of the power of casuistry (to which accomplishment she openly aspires), they also remind 
us of the perils that often travel behind its sophistications.  For example, consideration of 
the afterthoughts Elshtain has steadfastly not expressed about her rationalizations for the 
torture of alleged terrorists and on behalf of the justice of the Iraq war undermines 
Walzer’s hope that a more casuistic attitude toward ‘dirty hands’ would also set the stage 
for a larger share of public accountability.  Quite the contrary, this case-study with 
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reference to one of Walzer’s most prominent professed disciples suggests, if anything, 
that the flexibility casuistry facilitates in deliberating prior to action lays the groundwork 
for continued evasiveness in its aftermath.  But this may be a surprising turn of events 
only relative to what is, to begin with, an eccentric and ahistorical presentation of 
“casuistry” on Walzer’s part.179   
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Conclusion:  Dilemmas Deliberated 
“The dilemma of dirty hands,” Walzer stresses, “is a central feature of political 
life.”  And he seems to have a place for a ‘dirty hands of normal times’ – as embodied in 
a backroom deal cut between a party boss and a politician – or the typical ‘hustling and 
lying’ of ordinary politics.   Regardless of the scale of its impact, ‘dirty hands’ in the way 
Walzer speaks of it is not a hallmark of corruption but rather its opposite.180  If corruption 
twists public power toward a private good, ‘dirty hands’ are quintessentially acquired by 
a leader’s sacrifice, at a moment of high drama, precisely with a view to the public good.   
But Walzer also suggests that the nostrum behind a resigned shrug that “no one succeeds 
in politics without getting his hands dirty” may feel itself confirmed by reference to 
something as commonplace as negative campaign advertisements or electoral brokerage 
in smoke-filled rooms.  “It arises not merely as an occasional crisis in the career of this or 
that unlucky politician, but systematically and frequently.”181   Lawmakers in modern 
democracies, we might remind ourselves, trade horses all the time; democracies daily 
confront not only lawmakers but the citizens who choose lawmakers with binary choices 
between morally unpalatable options.  Walzer’s notion of ‘dirty hands’ embraces these 
mundane trade-offs as much as more epic conflicts.  
The ability to take on ‘dirty hands’  is part of what makes ‘good politicians’ 
worthy of that appellation in our eyes, says Walzer.   When Walzer accuses his readers of  
wanting  “our” politicians to be capable of getting their hands dirty, “capability” here, it 
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grows progressively clearer in the course of his essay, entails both a certain hardness as 
demanded by occasion – and a tendency toward appropriate remorse.   
Paradoxically, the presumption of a somehow innate capacity to take on ‘dirty 
hands’ on the part of skilled politicians– and yet rebound from the debacle --  also 
sometimes fosters a view of officials as a species set morally apart.  But this shy 
delegation is hypocrisy. Any plan to keep one’s own hands antiseptic, meanwhile 
deliberately leaving it to others to dirty their hands on our behalf, does not in fact absolve 
us of responsibility upon slight reflection.  Pretending that we can simply hand the wheel 
to others whenever we cannot help skidding into blind alleys is sheer self-deception; 
Walzer’s presupposition is that we travel in a democratic polity where directional levers 
always lie to some degree within reach, whether we choose to touch them or not.   And 
the immanent meaning of ‘dirty hands’ in Walzer’s essay cannot be derived without 
underscoring the democratic dimension of moral accountability. 
And indeed, I would argue, that Walzer, some appearances to the contrary, may 
by ultimately less interested in the actual logic or rhetoric of a casuistic defense than in 
the often parallel phenomenon of confession.  Crucial to the events which can restore the 
palms of leadership to whatever condition of hygiene is minimally required to resume 
their duties, is the presence of a mysterious “we”, a chorus palpably present just off the 
proscenium, although it is not quite audible in this essay.  Such an audience is required to 
receive and react to the guilty politician’s confession if it is to have any meaning at all.   
The transaction hinted at by Walzer, between a remorseful leader and his public, not 
conceivable in terms of the “Protestant” or “neoclassical” views as he has outlined them, 
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seems to be a kind of public confession followed by collective expiation.  Now we might 
want to suggest that Walzer is working with a political notion of confession in this text, 
not a sacramental one, or even fit his vision with the catharsis of pagan drama.  In any 
case, the action of “Political Action” would not be complete without the coda in which 
“we” of the democratic polity hand out appropriate comeuppance or mercy (that is, 
penance or absolution) to dirty-handed politicians – but profanely, that is, only by joining 
them at their own diabolical game.   
The thickets of costly rationalization in which a scholar and public intellectual as 
redoubtable as Jean Elshtain could become ensnared in the early 2000s,  succumbing to 
the ready pretext of unavoidable ‘dirty hands,’ certainly give pause -- particularly since 
this high-profile entanglement occurred at an historic moment in which it did not seem 
far-fetched to imagine that the whole world might be attending to the pronouncements of 
such authorities, and standing ready to be enraptured by an Ivy League display of 
casuistic pyrotechnics of the sort of which only her like could be capable.    
In her writings on torture, Elshtain seems to be in search of a hero who combines 
the faith of Kierkegaard’s Abraham with the can-do attitude of 24’s Jack Sparrow.  In 
Elshtain’s reconstruction of “Political Action,” when a statesperson gets it wrong, it is 
still the case that he or she might deserve another chance.  The important thing is that “He 
or she can stand before God as a guilty person and seek forgiveness.”182  With this 
turnabout, the theological themes Walzer had most explicitly associated with Weber lurch 
front  and center in Elshtain – though with a different valence.  Elshtain’s moral theology, 
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as revealed here, actually betrays a greater proximity to the stress upon subjective truth in 
Soren Kierkegaard than to far more objective and scientific posture of a MaxWeber.   
The Kierkegaardian aspect of Elshtain’s ‘dirty hands’ justification is its radical 
incommunicability.  At the same time that he suspends the moral law with a view to the 
telos of utilitarian benefit, Elshtain’s interrogator somehow simultaneously “eschews the 
exculpatory stratagems of utilitarianism.”183   The deepest difference between Faust and 
Abraham, according to Kierkegaard,  is that “the tragic hero is still within the ethical,” 
which Kierkegaard also calls “the universal,” whereas the “knight of faith” is “an 
emigrant from the sphere of the universal,” and for him “the ethical is the temptation.”184  
Having decided to “temporarily override a general prohibition,” Elshtain’s interrogator 
cannot return to the realm of the universal.  Like Abraham returning from Mt. Moriah, he 
must remain silent:  “They should not seek to legalize it.  They should not aim to 
normalize it.  And they should not write elaborate justifications of it.”185  They have done 
what they had to do under the circumstances, for no reason they can make intelligible to 
others.  Compare Kierkegaard:  “Abraham’s situation is different.  By his act he 
transgressed the ethical altogether and had a higher telos outside it, in relation to which 
he suspended it.”  Abraham chooses the absolute in a way only a solitary individual can, 
“by virtue of the absurd.”186   Thus, he can never explain himself.   He becomes the most 
important witness of his own action – and God’s.  But he cannot testify.  “First and 
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foremost, he does not say anything, and in that form he says what he has to say.” 187  
Though, in fidelity to utilitarian doctrine, Elshtain posits an ethical telos for her 
interrogator, as counted in lives to be saved, the religious dimension of the thought 
process she describes makes the resemblance to Kierkegaard’s “knight of faith” 
unmistakable.   She applauds the fact that Bonhoeffer never offered any public 
justification of his deeds.188  
Even at the point of his critique of Weber, the missing element is exposed at the 
lacunae where the “hero’s suffering needs to be socially expressed (for, like punishment, 
it confirms and reinforces our sense that certain acts are wrong).  And, equally important, 
it sometimes needs to be socially limited.”189  If an anticipated residue of guilt on the part 
of the leader who takes on dirty hands is to be relied upon as a fool-proof vaccine against 
terrible and grandiose delusion, then any advance from the preoccupation with tragic 
heroism attributed to Weber may be placed in question.   One of Walzer’s chief concerns 
(made most explicit in the second of his two main examples) points to the steady 
expectation of a public reckoning in the aftermath of an awful political choice of lesser 
evil.  What Walzer is plainly driving at is a system (though not clearly a political as 
opposed to a cultural system) of public accountability.   
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For Walzer, in notable contrast to Elshtain in this regard, a constant willingness to 
“explain ourselves to other men and women” is an intrinsic part of what it means to be a 
citizen – or a leader – of a democratic society, no matter what we do.190 
Moral life is a social phenomenon, and it is constituted at least in part by rules, the knowledge of 
which (and perhaps the making of which) we share with our fellows.  The experience of coming up 
against these rules, challenging their prohibitions, and explaining ourselves to other men and 
women is so common and so obviously important that no account of moral decision-making can 
possibly fail to come to grips with it.191 
  
For Walzer, an integral part what makes a ‘good politician’ good is a devotion to 
being as moral in all of her actions as it is possible for her to be   The final catch: we are 
all politicians.  The task of living a moral life and participating in political life, from 
Walzer’s taken-for-granted point-of-view, seeem necessarily to implicate one another.  
‘Dirty hands’ would not compel our attention to the same degree if we were not 
responsible for what others do in our name and ostensibly on our behalf.  And it seems 
crucial to Walzer’s perspective that we the people of a moral community can drag our 
feet (or, as Walzer even says, “be properly skeptical”) when asked to march behind a 
tyrant too quick to declare moral emergency, and somehow even strive to hold such 
abusive leaders accountable.192   
Walzer calls on citizens of the “moral communities” he addresses in his 1988 
restatement to be “reluctant to grant such exemptions” and “resist the routinization of 
emergency.”193  We are, in fact, he claims, “morally bound to work against the 
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persistence” of emergencies.194  Walzer urges readers, by this point, to find a way to 
avoid viewing “our dirty hands with less than abhorrence,” resolving that the 
compromises it entails are “something to which we can never be reconciled.”195   
But what exactly is it, we may continue to wonder, which can bolster the refusal 
of citizens of the “moral communities” Walzer addresses to allow dubious ‘emergencies’ 
to be perpetuated?  Do we not need to know more about how we can forestall “those who 
act for us and in our name” from becoming “killers too quickly and easily”?196   In the 
light of what standard, it  seems fair to ask, are excessively or too flagrantly dirtied hands 
to be “socially limited”?   If we are able, as Walzer wants, to “deny power and glory to 
the greatest liars,” against what beam is such overreaching balanced?197  Walzer’s 
recourse to “prohibitions and taboos” seems altogether too vague198  .   
The British philosopher Bernard Williams expresses a consanguine impatience 
with ethical orthodoxy at virtually the same time Walzer is writing “Political Action.”199  
Adding the paradoxical examples etched by Williams to Walzer’s analysis challenges us 
to try out Williams’ “integrity” as a core value belonging not only to individuals as moral 
agents, but whole communities.  By the time of “Emergency Ethics,” Walzer is searching 
for a way to tether “our” reluctance to grant exemptions to politicians eager to proclaim 
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“emergency!” whenever they find it “morally convenient.”200  Walzer concludes that the 
only force capable of instilling effective restraint will be a public recognition that 
“communal death” can be threatened as much by official immorality as by the disaster 
‘dirty handed’ actions might be employed to forestall.  Thus, Walzer seems to envision 
those on whose behalf ‘dirty hands’ are said to be necessary rising in rebellious defense 
of their way of life, even at the risk of sacrificing their physical safety.  What must 
intervene is a deep loyalty to what Walzer also calls “solidarity,” or, alternatively, “the 
ongoingness of the community.”201  To convey what he means by pronouncing this odd 
abstract noun “ongoingness,” Walzer quotes Edmund Burke’s aphorism about a contract 
between the living, the dead, and the unborn of a society.  This contract precludes our 
resignation as a people to any means of preservation which lead us to “imitate our worst 
enemies.”202     If we jettison our moral principles in order to save our lives, we may end 
up feeling profoundly foolish as we “stand by and watch the destruction of the moral 
world in which those principles and prohibitions have their hold.”203   
Borrowing the terms of  Bernard Williams’ reflections, perhaps we can avoid 
shrinking from the most disquieting epigram in all of Walzer’s publications on ‘dirty 
hands” by turning it on its head.  At the end of “Emergency Ethics,” Walzer intones:  
“moral communities make great immoralities possible.”204  Perhaps it could at least also 
be said that, just as for the moral figures of Jim and George at the center of Williams’ 
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parables, moral communities with integrity will make certain immoralities impossible, 
regardless of the circumstances which may seem to call for them.  A certain type of 
action could be renounced by the polity on the grounds that, in respect of a sense of 
communal identity more than absolute morality, no entity capable of performing such an 
action could be recognizable as “us.”  Thinking even a bit further beyond Walzer’s 1988 
communitarian standard of integrity, we might further inquire whether the ongoingness 
urges us to cherish could be embodied in the fundamental laws and institutions of a 
community, rather than showing itself only when the leaders of that community find it 
necessary to act outside those procedures.   
 
What Bernard Williams calls “integrity” and what Camus and some of his 
characters invoke as “honor” may not in all cases be distinguishable from Machiavelli’s 
“glory” or Weber’s “conscience.”  Williams’ “integrity” and Camus’ “honor” would 
seem to have in common, not to be equated with an indifference to consequences, a 
factoring in, along one’s best estimates of those consequences, a consideration of what 
the actions in question would say about “who one is.”  Such a vision might enable a 
political actor to draw a line between doing her best in the face of insurmountable 
contingencies and deliberately doing evil in the prospect of doing good.  Thus, without 
recourse to deontological theories,  such pivots might support a preference for reflection 
over speculation.   
Few outcomes are ever certain.  In the face of life’s greatest uncertainties (no 
doubt including those suffused with the most agonizing moral dilemmas), deliberations 
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where the stakes are highest might be well served by a certain retrospective gaze as much 
as by future projections.  Perhaps an assessment subsumable neither by calculations of 
future costs and benefits nor universalizable maxims can be made to sum the meaning 
one has taken one’s life to this point to have, and perhaps this can be broadened to a 
conception of the life of a community and not just an individual agent.  As Williams 
underscores this point in a subsequent essay: “a habit of reluctance is an essential 
obstacle against the happy acceptance of the intolerable.”205  By “reluctance,” Williams 
elaborates that he speaks of “not just initial hesitation in reaching for the answer, but 
genuine disquiet when one arrives at it.” And as he puts it, “Only those who are reluctant 
or disinclined to do the morally disagreeable when it is really necessary have much 
chance of not doing it when it is not necessary.”206    
The sympathetic reconstruction of a deliberatively democratic subtext to 
“Political Action,” hemmed in by consideration of personal and collective integrity is 
confirmed by some of Walzer’s subsequent work (where his omission of further mention 
of his once-favored notion gives every impression that he has become a lapsed casuist).  
But this attempt at rescue does not erase any of the potentially even larger problems with  
argument of “Poltical Action” -- in ways preceding sections of this essay have attempted 
to suggest, among others.  Though the modesty of its immediate demurral of any pretense 
to the possibility of erecting a bridge where none can be made to stand may hold abiding 
appeal, the notion of ‘dirty hands,’ in Walzer’s treatment remains troubling in ways 
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beyond those he plainly intends.  The fact that Walzer’s argument regarding ‘dirty hands’ 
does not propose a solution to the problem it takes up, but instead argues for the 
permanent unavailability of a solution, does not make its thesis less controversial but only 
more so.  Though the showy embrace of equivocation in Walzer’s take on ‘dirty hands’ 
may continue to persuade many that less nuanced answers fall short of the genuine 
complexity of the phenomena it describes, disappointment will persist in other quarters, 
where Walzer’s tenaciously tentative settlement of the issues entailed by what he calls 
‘dirty hands’ will be regarded as a peremptory and unwarranted gesture of theoretical 
surrender.  In sum, the question remains as to whether this signpost does more to 
illuminate than to further enshroud the inherently murky realm it would ostensibly help 
navigate.  
 ‘Dirty hands,’ ostensibly a ‘limit situation’ at the boundaries of moral life, 
actually serves as a concept to posit an opaque nodal point at its center, a spoke at the 
center of the wheel, as it were, from which everything, at almost any time, could come 
apart.  A conscientious politician is sought who can be clear-eyed about seeing what is 
wrong, stout-hearted in carrying it through in the most expedient way, but repentant in 
the wake of moral disaster.  But the problem for the theory is that, by imagining this 
nodal point in the eye of the storm, it makes it seem that things could go either way with 
equal justice – without actually saying so.  Thus in the end, though presenting itself as a 
theory for the moralization of politics, “dirty hands” runs the risk of providing the blue-
print for a deliberative process is which arbitrary will according to expedience is 
privileged over rights and law.  ‘Dirty hands’ spins out hypotheticals like its ‘ticking 
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time-bomb scenario,” thus threatening to make casuistically buffered exceptions the 
norm.  By anticipating a blinding collision of moral theories which may well transpire 
nowhere else as frequently as in the seminar room, the theory itself holds the potential to 
encourage a kind of reflective defeatism, ultimately encouraging a propensity and 
installing the ready offer of rationalization for, in a moment of crisis, a simple 
unwillingness to think things through.  Judging and conscience are the by-products of 
thinking, according to Hannah Arendt.  But she adds that:  
When everybody is swept away unblinkingly by what everybody else does and believes in, those 
who think are drawn out of hiding because their refusal to join is conspicuous and thereby becomes 
a kind of action…. The manifestation of the wind of thought is no knowledge; it is the ability to tell 
right from wrong, beautiful from ugly.  And this indeed may prevent catastrophes, at least for 
oneself, in the rare moments when the chips are down.207   
 
Arendt suggests that thinking is the most precious of human capacities not in some 
metaphysical sense but in the political realm of our times.  The courage to think, as a 
form rather than an alternative to action -- insofar as it compels one to pause long enough 
to notice which moral qualms are impregnable, regardless of how extreme the 
circumstances -- is thus never incompatible with a refusal to think the unthinkable.   
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